‘May you live to 120!’ Jean-Paul Sartre (21 June 1905 - 15 April 1980) 'The Freud Scenario' for John Huston’s film 'Freud: The Secret Passion' (1960). Anthony Stadlen and Yaara Sumeruk conduct by Zoom Inner Circle Seminar 302 (22 June 2025)

 

‘May you live to 120!’

Jean-Paul Sartre

(21 June 1905 - 15 April 1980)

Further studies in existential seduction theory

Sartre’s Freud Scenario

for John Huston’s film

Freud: The Secret Passion (1960)

Was Sartre seduced by Freud’s bad faith in his explanations of his retraction of his seduction theory?

Anthony Stadlen  Yaara Sumeruk

conduct by Zoom

Inner Circle Seminar No. 302

Sunday 22 June 2025

10 a.m. to 5 p.m.

   Jean-Paul Sartre             Néant

   

   

                                    

 Jofi               Sigmund Freud
courtesy of the Freud Museum, London

   

‘The authority on Freud’s original “seduction” theory, its genesis and its ultimate fate, is surely Anthony Stadlen.’

             John Kerr A Most Dangerous Method (1993)

 

1

The first Inner Circle Seminar was convened by Anthony Stadlen at Regent’s College in London on Sunday 21 April 1996, the centenary of Sigmund Freud’s announcement, on 21 April 1896 at the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna, of the name ‘psychoanalysis’ and of what has come to be known as his ‘seduction theory’ of the aetiology of ‘hysteria’. Stadlen attempted to begin laying the groundwork for what he called  ‘existential seduction theory’.

Subsequent seminars over the years continued to develop this theme, in particular Inner Circle Seminar No. 283 two years ago on 18 June 2023, ‘Intellectuals’ and Sexual Abuse, see:

Daseinsanalysis, Existential Analysis, Inner Circle Seminars: Anthony Stadlen, London W1, NW3, N22: ‘Intellectuals’ and Sexual Abuse. 20th-century advocates of adults’ ‘right’ to sexual relations with ‘consenting’ children. A further contribution to existential seduction theory. Anthony Stadlen conducts by Zoom Inner Circle Seminar 283 (18 June 2023)

In the following, we start by recapitulating the relevant sections of the introduction to that seminar.

 

2

Freud himself never, in his Collected Works, used the term ‘seduction theory’, but the term is accurate in that he did use the word ‘seduction’ (‘Verführung’) to characterise what he called his ‘assertion’ (‘Behauptung’) of 1896. The term ‘seduction’ has been criticised, especially by feminists, because even by his own account, accurate or inaccurate, he was in at least some cases reporting or imputing, not merely seductive sexual abuse (‘Mißbrauch’, as he called it) of children, which was rape in the legal sense, but unequivocal, phenomenologically violent rape.

However, the term ‘seduction’ is more accurate than appears to be generally realised or acknowledged, because Freud’s so-called ‘seduction theory’ applied only to those who, in his view, had ‘repressed’ the memory of childhood rape. That is to say, Freud’s hypothesis was that the child, in what Sartre calls mauvaise foi (bad faith, self deception), had seduced itself into pretending to itself to have forgotten, and to have forgotten having forgotten, and to have forgetten that there was anything to forget, whether or not the abuser – the rapist or seducer – had implicitly or explicitly seduced the child into this seduction of itself by itself into the pretence to forget.   

Freud first announced the seduction theory in a paper ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’ published in French in March 1896. He wrote that his new method of both research and therapy, ‘psychoanalysis’, here publicly named for the first time, had revealed that

‘[...] a precocious experience of sexual relations with actual excitement of the genitals, resulting from sexual abuse [Mißbrauch] committed by another person in the years up to the age of eight to ten, before the child has reached sexual maturity [...] is the specific aetiology of hysteria.’

On 21 April 1896 he repeated in a paper, ‘The Aetiology of Hysteria’, at the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna, with the leading sexologist Richard Freiherr von Krafft-Ebing in the chair, that the ‘specific aetiology’ of ‘hysteria’ was sexual abuse (‘Mißbrauch’) in childhood ‘before the age of second dentition’.

In the published paper (not merely as a throwaway comment in his spoken presentation) he called this

‘a momentous finding, the discovery of a caput Nili [source of the Nile] in neuropathology’.

This was named much later, though not by him, his ‘seduction theory’.

By ‘specific aetiology’ Freud had explained, in his 1895 paper ‘A Reply to Criticisms of my Paper on the Anxiety Neurosis’, that he meant a single feature necessarily present in every case of the ‘illness’, which when sufficiently intensified would lead to the ‘illness’ being necessarily present, like the ‘Bacillus Kochii’, whose discovery by Robert Koch a decade earlier had made Koch world-famous for solving the riddle of tuberculosis.

It is crucial to understand that Freud took ‘hysteria’ to be a physical illness and himself to be a bona fide doctor (physician) and medical researcher. In his 1905 ‘Dora’ case study he claimed that ‘hysteria’ was a real physical illness which mimicked other real physical illnesses. He was claiming to have discovered a caput Nili in neuropathology, not merely in ‘psychopathology’. This is one of the reasons Thomas Szasz was justified, sixty-five years later, in taking ‘hysteria’ as his paradigmatic ‘mental illness’ in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961).

It is true that Freud had already, in his and Josef Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1895), justified using the means of the Dichter (creative writer) to make his case studies read ‘like novellas’, but this was in the service of medical science. His argument that psychoanalysis was not a medical discipline came thirty years later, in The Question of Lay Analysis (1926).  

Freud privately acknowledged, in a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fließ, that he had hopes of becoming famous before he was forty. He made his implicit claim to be the Koch of ‘hysteria’ to the Vienna Society and Krafft-Ebing two weeks before his fortieth birthday. However, he subsequently retracted the claim, but gave, over the years, somewhat contradictory and misleading reasons for this retraction which were further mystified by later writers.

On 20 October 1973, the philosopher Frank Cioffi gave a talk on BBC Radio 3, published in The Listener on 7 February 1974, ‘Was Freud a Liar?’. Cioffi concluded, at this stage of his thinking, that Freud was not a liar, but was self-deceived, from pride. This, however, raises Sartre’s question in Being and Nothingness (1943), whether there can be, as Freud’s ‘metapsychology’ implied, genuine self-deception: ‘a lie without a liar’.

Cioffi pointed out that in the ‘seduction theory’ Freud had stated: (1) that only under the ‘strongest compulsion’ of his avant-garde method, which he here  for the first time named as ‘psychoanalysis’, could his patients be persuaded to ‘reproduce’ the ‘scenes’ of sexual abuse in childhood that he admitted he was, at least sometimes, suggesting to them; and (2) that the patients objected that these ‘scenes’, even if ‘reproduced’ with emotion, did not feel like memories. This, Freud bizarrely insisted, was the most decisive proof that they were memories.

But Cioffi also pointed out the crucial, undeniable, but hitherto apparently unnoticed fact that, in Freud’s purported retraction of his theory, a retraction which took various forms over the years, he managed to convey, without contradiction from readers, that his original seduction theory had been quite different from what it actually had been. He now indicated that his patients had volunteered stories of childhood sexual abuse, which he had at first believed, but then, ‘in definitely ascertainable circumstances’, discovered to his chagrin to be fantasies. He represented this as a triumph rather than a defeat, as he claimed his error had led him to discover childhood sexuality and the Oedipus complex.

It is a common mystification of everyday life to apologise for a lesser error than the error one has made. Freud showed that he, too, was capable of doing so.

Freud did not just revise his seduction theory. He silently revised what the seduction theory he revised had been.  

Freud loved to give detailed evidence, when he had it, or thought he had it. As mentioned above, his detailed case studies read, as he said, ‘like novellas’. He justified using the methods of the Dichter (creative writer) to show ‘the relationship between the Leidensgeschichte [deep, perhaps unacknowledged or denied (“unconscious”) existential suffering-history] and the Leiden [presenting complaint]’.

However, he insisted that his case studies were not fiction. He wrote that he regarded it as an ‘abuse’ (‘Mißbrauch’) to change any aspect of a case history apart from the minimum required to preserve anonymity.

But neither for the seduction theory nor for its retraction did he give evidence.

Although both Freud’s ‘Katharina’ case of 1895 and his ‘Dora’ case of 1905 are brilliantly written, neither qualifies as evidence either for the seduction theory or for the retraction. He ‘treated’ both these supposedly ‘hysterical’ young women when they were eighteen. Both had been incestuously or quasi-incestuously abused in early adolescence, Katharina by her father and Dora by her father’s best friend with her father’s implicit collusion. But in neither case is there mention of abuse before the age of second dentition as required by the seduction theory. The two cases do, however, suggest a radical change in Freud’s thinking between 1895 and 1905. He regards Katharina’s vomiting, after she discovered her father having intercourse with her cousin, as an ‘hysterical symptom’ of what he implies was her justified but ‘unconscious’ disgust at her own earlier sexual abuse by her father; but he regards Dora’s conscious disgust at her sexual abuse by her father’s friend at the same age as Katharina’s abuse by her father as itself a pathognomonic ‘symptom’ of her alleged ‘hysteria’ (i.e., a phenomenon sufficient in itself to justify the diagnosis ‘hysteria’). 

He did not publish a single case study, or even vignette, to illustrate or substantiate his claim that he had discovered that some patients who had reported sexual abuse in childhood were merely fantasising. Yet he claimed to have done so ‘in definitely ascertainable circumstances’.

(Of course, that he did not give evidence does not mean that nobody ever does so fantasise.)

In a number of his published and unpublished case studies, both before and after the seduction theory episode, Freud reports detailed accounts by the patient of having been sexually abused in early or late childhood. In every case Freud believes the patient without question. And in none of these specific cases does Freud claim, far less give evidence, that the person had been merely fantasising. 

Stadlen emphasised that the seduction theory was an all-or-nothing theory. The specific aetiology claim meant that a single counter-example (though how one could be certain one had found one is unclear: how could one prove someone had never ever been sexually abused and repressed the memory of it?) would not just modify the theory a little. It would completely disprove it. Freud knew this, as he had specifically defined ‘specific aetiology’ thus. But he in effect blamed his patients for his mistake which he tried to turn into a triumph. 

His ‘seduction theory’ and his retraction of it had in common his claim that he was right and the patient was wrong.

But both the ‘seduction theory’ and the retraction were false.

According to Freud, in his 1914 essay ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’ (GW10, p. 56; SE14, p. 18),

‘[Karl] Abraham pronounced the last word on the question of the traumatic aetiology when he pointed out how precisely the peculiarity of the sexual constitution of the child knows how to provoke sexual events of a particular kind, thus traumas.’

It should be emphasised, however, that – despite Freud’s questionably uncritical attitude to the adolescent Dora’s sexual molestation by her father’s friend Herr K. (he actually calls her ‘a child of fourteen’, and Stadlen’s research shows that she was almost certainly only thirteen, below the Austrian age of consent which was fourteen at the time and in fact to this day) – he was quite clear that sexual relationships of adults with prepubertal children were indeed sexual abuse and should be treated as criminal.

Moreover, Freud never claimed that all the patients he had taken to be sexually abused in childhood had merely been fantasising. But innumerable twentieth-century writers, for example Freud’s authorised biographer Ernest Jones (1953), asserted that this was precisely what Freud’s great ‘discovery’ had been. Jones eulogised and romanticised the year 1897, when Freud, in a private letter on 21 September 1897 to his friend Wilhelm Fließ, retracted the ‘seduction theory’ and ‘discovered’ childhood oedipal phantasy on which adults’ supposedly fantasied memories of supposed childhood sexual seduction were supposedly based. ‘1897,’ wrote Jones, ‘was the acme of Freud’s life.’

It became difficult for those who had been sexually abused as children not to be disbelieved, not only by psychoanalysts but also by lay people who had heard or read something about psychoanalysis and its history.

A further crucial mystification throughout this history has been the presumption of illness: ‘mental illness’. We have discussed this in many seminars, and will not repeat the argument here. 

However, not only was ‘hysteria‘ taken by Freud to be an actual disease or illness which imitated other actual diseases or illnesses (as he explains in the ‘Dora’ case study), but throughout most of the twentieth century a report of childhood sexual abuse was liable to be taken, by psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and lay people influenced by what they had picked up from superficial reading of or hearing about Freud, as itself evidence of a supposed ‘mental illness’ of the person reporting having been abused.

3

It is important to realise that, two-thirds through the twentieth century, it was still commonplace, both in specialised psychoanalytic writings and in more general or popular accounts, to repeat, without any apparent sense of unreality, unlikelihood, or lack of common sense, that all Freud’s patients at the time he was developing the seduction theory told him they had been sexually abused, but turned out to be fantasising; and that this enabled him to discover that there was, in fact, for a child no difference between a real or a fantasied seduction or assault. 

For example, The Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis (1968), an authoritative work, edited by the psychoanalyst Ludwig Edinger with the assistance of other eminent psychoanalysts including Harold Blum, Edward Glover, Bertram Lewin, William Niederland, and Leonard Shengold, contains the following statements:

1. (p. 156) ‘In his autobiographical study, Freud (1925) was to recall that he was at first convinced that the seduction of children actually took place and was responsible for their neuroses. Later, he discovered that these patients reported seductions which hadn’t taken place. Consequently his theory of seduction had to be abandoned. Finally, he realised that from the child’s point of view there was no difference between a real seduction and the wish to be seduced. He therefore introduced the concept of psychic reality which accounts for this apparent contradiction.’
2. (p. 340) ‘At first Freud (1895) believed that what his patients reported as seductions in early childhood had actually occurred. Only later (in 1906) did he discover that they had never taken place and represented the child’s wishes. This discovery at first confused him, until he realised that for a child a wish may be equal to an actual experience. Freud called this kind of infantile experience psychic reality.’      

There are a couple of more nuanced brief allusions to the seduction theory episode in the Encyclopedia, but it is telling that the above two statements were approved.

Typical of countless other examples is the account, chosen at random, in Sigmund Freud: A Short Biography by Giovanni Costigan (1965, p. 43):

‘Gradually, he was led to doubt the actuality of these stories of seduction in early childhood, upon which his entire theory of hysteria had been founded, and in course of time he came to abandon his belief in them altogether.’

It might be objected that Costigan’s is a popular account. But the same misleading story continued to be told by supposedly scholarly specialists, even after Cioffi’s demystification of 1973-4. For example, Alan Krohn in Hysteria: The Elusive Neurosis (1978, p. 21) wrote:

‘Once again demonstrating his courage and scientific integrity, Freud came to see that the “seduction theory” was wrong, and that what patients had reported as memories of seductions were in fact fantasies that had been formed to cover up auto-erotic activity (and associated fantasies) in childhood. With Freud’s realization that these “memories” were remnants of infantile wishes came his recognition of the role of infantile sexuality.’

Three further examples may hint at the extent to which interpersonal reality became discounted by psychoanalysts following Freud’s retraction of his seduction theory and replacement of it by ‘psychic reality’:

1. The Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis (1968, p. 109) explains:‘The feeling of disgust [Dora] felt when Herr K.’s erect penis pressed against her body (at fourteen) probably meant that she resented the size of her own member. That is, it represented a defense against her consciousness of penis envy. This feeling of disgust persisted, and perhaps was responsible for her refusal to play a feminine role. In this, her father and Herr K. were her competitors. They had what she had not, a penis.’
2. Melanie Klein’s concept of ‘projective identification’ is today often thought to describe an interpersonal situation. It is taken to mean that person P in phantasy ‘projects’ an unacceptable aspect of P, e.g. faeces F, into another person O, and O in phantasy identifies with F. This would be an important concept in its own right. But this is not how Klein originally defined it, in ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ (1946). Her concept was purely intrapsychic, and she never changed it. As she describes it, person P projects unacceptable psychic material, e.g. phantasied faeces (F), into the ‘inner object’ representing person O in person P’s own ‘psyche’ or ‘inner world’. And it is person P, not O, who identifies with F, but now as part of ‘inner object’ O, still within P. This was still how ‘projective identification’ was correctly defined, directly quoting Klein’s original, wholly intrapsychic account, in The Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis (1968, pp. 332-3).   
3. John Bowlby reported that, as a young psychoanalyst, he had wanted to study what happened between mothers and babies. But, he said, he was told that this was not an activity worthy of an analyst, because since Freud had given up the seduction theory it was known that all that mattered was unconscious phantasy.

‘Intellectuals’, and by no means only those who called for the ‘liberation’ of children’s sexuality and of adults’ right to enjoy and exploit it, were often, like the psychoanalysts themselves, seduced by Freud’s and Jones’s seductive misrepresentation of the rise and fall of Freud’s seduction theory. Cioffi’s 1973 demystification of the episode went unnoticed.

Again and again, it was falsely repeated, even a century later, by otherwise educated and intelligent people, not apparently in other respects out of touch with ordinary social reality, that all Freud’s ‘hysterical’ patients in the seduction theory period told him they had been sexually abused; that he had at first believed them all; but that he had then discovered that they were all merely fantasising.

For example, Dr John Casey, Life Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, wrote (Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1995), a few months before the centenary of Freud's announcement of his seduction theory: 

‘[...] patients came to [Freud] describing all sorts of sexual assaults and seductions by their parents and other relatives [which he at first believed but] then decided that these stories were all fantasies’.

4

Sartre may serve as a paradigm case.

In Being and Nothingness (1943) Sartre lucidly and rigorously defined and analysed mauvaise foi (bad faith, self-deception). He ruthlessly revealed the contradictions in Freud’s ‘metapsychology’ of ‘repression’, the ‘unconscious’, and the ‘censor’. 

But Sartre did not manifest the same clarity and sense of reality when addressing Freud’s seduction theory and retraction. He did not have the benefit of Cioffi’s analysis of 1974, but the data were as available to him as to Cioffi, when, in 1958, he wrote a gigantic screenplay, commissioned and drastically shortened by John Huston for his film Freud: The Secret Passion (1962), and eventually published posthumously in full as Sartre’s The Freud Scenario (1984). This scenario is remarkable in many respects, but Sartre perhaps became a paradigm case of his own concept of bad faith in that he allowed himself to be naively seduced by both Freud’s and Jones’s false accounts of the seduction theory and its retraction. Freud, as we emphasised above, had failed to give a single actual example, let alone case study, of a patient whose report of being sexually abused as a child he had at first believed but then shown (‘in definitely ascertainable circumstances’, as he claimed) to be a fantasy; yet Jones (though not Freud) had claimed this was true of all Freud’s eighteen seduction theory patients.

Sartre was undeterred. He simply invented a paradigm patient, Cäcilie (in the film, Cecily), to exemplify both the seduction theory and its false retraction. Sartre showed Freud helping the fictitious Cäcilie first ‘remember’ that her father had raped her when she was a little child (the seduction theory) and then ‘realise’ that she had imagined this (in conscious ‘fantasy’) because of her oedipal desire (in unconscious ‘phantasy’) for her father (the retraction).

Sartre wanted his paradigmatic Cäcilie to be played by Marilyn Monroe; but his wish was not fulfilled.

Sartre was one of the ‘intellectuals’ who signed the 1977 petition to the French Parliament on ‘consenting’ sexual relationships between adults and children. Did Freud’s false account of his retraction of the seduction theory and ‘discovery’ of infantile sexuality, as reimagined by Sartre in The Freud Scenario, play a part in Sartre’s thinking on the age of consent?

 

5

Today we shall attempt to answer this question in more detail and depth than we did two years ago. We shall read extracts from Sartre’s Freud Scenario and watch Huston’s film.  Yaara Sumeruk, the film director known to participants in these seminars for her brilliant co-conducting of seminars on, and direction of, her highly original film-in-progress on Laing and Esterson’s Sanity, Madness and the Family: Families of Schizophrenics (1964), will assess from the professional point of view Huston’s film and Sartre’s Scenario. Anthony Stadlen will contribute his historical, philosophical, and psychotherapeutic reflections. Your contribution will be warmly welcomed.

This will be an online seminar, using Zoom.

Cost: Psychotherapy trainees £140, others £175; some bursaries

Apply to: Anthony Stadlen, ‘Oakleigh’, 2A Alexandra Avenue, London N22 7XE

Tel: +44 (0) 7809 433250  

E-mail: stadlenanthony@gmail.com

For further information on seminars, visit: http://anthonystadlen.blogspot.com/

The Inner Circle Seminars were founded by Anthony Stadlen in 1996 as an ethical, existential, phenomenological search for truth in psychotherapy. They have been kindly described by Thomas Szasz as ‘Institute for Advanced Studies in the Moral Foundations of Human Decency and Helpfulness’. But they are independent of all institutes, schools, and universities.

Does Heidegger allow space for free will? Raymond Tallis conducts by Zoom Inner Circle Seminar 296 (16 February 2025)

 

Does Heidegger allow space for free will?

Raymond Tallis

conducts by Zoom

his eleventh Inner Circle Seminar: No. 296

introduced by Anthony Stadlen

Sunday 16 February 2025

10 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Raymond Tallis (10 October 1946 – )

Martin Heidegger (26 September 1899 – 26 May 1976)

Raymond Tallis is one of our best-loved invited speakers. Today he conducts his eleventh Inner Circle Seminar (his first was on 2 December 2012).

 

Professor Tallis has shown in ten profound Inner Circle Seminars that he is one of the world’s leading demystifiers of what he calls the ‘neuroscience delusion’ (‘neuromania’) and the ‘intellectual plague of biologism’ (‘animalism’). His ruthless, good-humoured exposure of reductive natural-scientism continues the tradition of Heidegger and Szasz, for example, but is utterly his own.  The heart of his thinking, which has informed all his more than thirty books and all the seminars he has conducted for us, is in harmony with the underlying philosophy and raison d'être of the Inner Circle Seminars as a whole. Psychotherapists are free to choose to go on pretending to be ‘validated’ by ‘neuroscience’; but their work, such as it is, sometimes radically transforming and helpful, sometimes best passed over in silence, speaks for, or against, itself, as the case may be; and no pseudo-scientific ‘validation’, or ‘invalidation’, can disguise this.

Raymond Tallis is one of the select few who affirms and advocates human language to depict and describe the human world and human relationships.

In his book Logos Professor Tallis exposes the absurdity of the argument that evolutionary biology or neuroscience show that our thinking is merely a function of our bodies-as-objects-for-science and therefore can have no truth-value of its own unless it is in some way itself derived from evolutionary biology or neuroscience, which are taken to be ‘objectively true’. But those sciences are themselves human creations, and therefore, by this argument, not ‘objectively true’. Professor Tallis remarks that those who use this argument are worthy successors of the Cretan of old who said all Cretans were liars.

Raymond Tallis introduces his seminar today as follows:

Does Heidegger Allow Space for Free Will?

In a previous seminar, I made the case for the reality of agency in the face of the currently dominant naturalist, scientistic philosophy that seemed to demonstrate its impossibility. At the heart of my defence of free will was an appeal to the distinctive nature of actions and that in virtue of which they are put together. Agents engage with the natural world from a virtual outside: their actions are the realisation of prior envisaged possibilities and of the tensed time in which possibilities are located (such that they are occasioned by an envisaged  future informed by a past that is present). Actions are radically different from other material events that are propelled into being by past events which are their causal ancestors.

There is some overlap between this account of the properties of the human agent and Heidegger’s Dasein that is ‘ahead of’ and ‘cares for itself’. However, Heidegger’s resistance to addressing the question of embodiment and his desire to avoid any hint of a Cartesian dualism – so that he marginalises the body-as-object – brings problems for understanding agency. The endeavour to dissolve individuals into “being-in-the-world” makes it difficult to see how Da-sein is individuated and how, consequently, its agency has a point d’appui; in particular how its actions are located in physical space and physical time. 

Heidegger’s failure to deal with embodiment (flagged up by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) is not, I shall argue, adequately addressed by his invoking a distinction between the body-as-object (Körper) and a living body open to the world (Leib). There are many reasons for claiming this but one I shall examine in some detail is the necessity for an ontological democracy between the body and the material world in order that human being should have, and pursue, an agenda that serves specific needs. 

While I shall shrink from the blasphemy of accusing the Heidegger of Being and Time of even a hint of idealism, the ‘world’ in which being-in-the-world has its being seems to lack those intrinsic properties that a) transcend the human subject and b) have come into being prior to the emergence of such subjects. The permission Heidegger gives himself to start from, and remain within, a realm outside the natural world, while it may seem to deal with the challenge of determinism undermines, even empties, the very idea of an agency on account of removing any ultimate basis for Dasein to have a particular agenda. It is not surprising that his notion of freedom weakened in his later writing to Gelassenheit or authentic non-willing.

Most, if not all, Heidegger authorities will surely protest that this is a fundamental misunderstanding, so this should be an enthralling seminar!

 

Raymond Tallis is a philosopher, poet, novelist and cultural critic, and a retired physician and clinical neuroscientist. He ran a large clinical service in Hope Hospital Salford and an academic department in the University of Manchester. His research focussed on epilepsy, stroke, and neurological rehabilitation.

He trained in medicine at Oxford University and at St Thomas’s Hospital in London before going on to become Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester and a consultant physician. He was an editor and major contributor to two key textbooks in the field, The Clinical Neurology of Old Age and Textbook of Geriatric Medicine and Gerontology, and author of over 200 original scientific articles, mainly in clinical neuroscience, including papers in Nature Medicine, Brain, Lancet. In 2000, he was elected Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences in recognition of his contribution to medical research. Among many prizes, he was awarded the Lord Cohen Gold Medal for Research into Ageing. He played a key part in developing guidelines for the care of stroke patients in the UK. From 2011-14 he was Chair, Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying (HPAD). He was a member of the Council of Royal College of Physicians between 2016 and 2019. He is a member of the criteria-setting group for the UK Research Excellence Framework 2021 in philosophy.

He has published fiction, poetry, and 30 books on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, and literary and cultural criticism. Aping Mankind (2010) was reissued in 2016 as a Routledge Classic. Of Time and Lamentation. Reflections on Transience (2017; 2019) a comprehensive inquiry into the nature of time was widely praised. NHS SOS (2012), co-edited with Jacky Davis, examined the destructive impact of Tory policies on the NHS. Logos. An Essay on the Mystery of the Sense-Making Animal was published in Spring 2018. His most recent volume of verse – Sunburst – was published in November 2019.

A series of eight seminars on Humanism given in the philosophy department of Charles University Prague, formed the basis of his book, published in 2020, Seeing Ourselves. Reclaiming Humanity from God and Science. A defence of free will – Freedom. An Impossible Reality – was published in May 2021 and an issue of the philosophy journal Human Affairs was devoted to it. Professor Tallis has based a number of Inner Circle Seminars on these books.

His most recent books are Prague 22. A Philosopher Takes a Tram through a City’ (Philosophy Now Publications, forthcoming 2024) and Circling Round Explicitness. The Heart of the Mystery of Human Being (Acumen, 2025).

In 2009, the Economist Intelligent Life Magazine described him as one of the world’s leading polymaths. The critic Stuart Kelly said of him in Scotland on Sunday in 2016 that ‘he is one of the very few contemporary thinkers whom I would unequivocally call a genius’. He has four honorary degrees: DLitt (Hull, 1997) and Litt.D. (Manchester, 2001) for contributions to the humanities; and DSc (St George’s Hospital Medical School, 2015; University of East Anglia, 2017) for contributions to research in medicine.

For an account of how Raymond Tallis writes his extraordinary books, see his article ‘My writing day: In my favourite pub, the staff turn down the speaker in my writing corner’, in The Guardian Review of 29 April 2017:

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/apr/29/my-writing-day-raymond-tallis

Nicholas Fearn wrote in The Independent:

When Kirsty Young was asked to name her favourite guest on Desert Island Discs, the rock star Paul Weller was beaten into second place, for her own luxury item would be the writer Raymond Tallis.

Raymond Tallis, whose eleventh Inner Circle Seminar this will be, kindly confirms that our seminar structure, in which dialogue is of the essence, enables him to communicate and reflect on his ideas. What he values most in our seminars is that through dialogue and disagreement we hope to approach a little closer to truth. He wrote, after his first Inner Circle Seminar, The Intellectual Plague of Biologism, on 2 December 2012:

The seminar was for me an incredible experience. I have never previously had the opportunity to discuss the topics we covered in such depth with a group of people who came at it from such different angles but in a way that I found illuminating. I learned a lot. It was a tremendous privilege.

This will be an online seminar, using Zoom.

Cost: Psychotherapy trainees £140, others £175; reductions for combinations of seminars; some bursaries

Apply to: Anthony Stadlen, ‘Oakleigh’, 2A Alexandra Avenue, London N22 7XE

Tel: +44 (0) 7809 433250  

E-mail: stadlenanthony@gmail.com

For further information on seminars, visit: http://anthonystadlen.blogspot.com/

The Inner Circle Seminars were founded by Anthony Stadlen in 1996 as an ethical, existential, phenomenological search for truth in psychotherapy. They have been kindly described by Thomas Szasz as ‘Institute for Advanced Studies in the Moral Foundations of Human Decency and Helpfulness’. But they are independent of all institutes, schools, and universities.