Families
‘Till this moment, I never knew myself’
Naomi and Anthony Stadlen
Copyright © Naomi and Anthony Stadlen 2004
Not to be copied, reproduced or quoted
without permission from the authors
1.
Introduction
Existential thinking on families has a fine
tradition to build on.
Insight
into family relationships is not new. Stories from many different cultures
record a wealth of such insight, existential in all but name. For example, many
stories describe what happens when parents favour (or disfavour) one of their
children above the rest. In Genesis
(25.28), Isaac and Rebecca have twin sons: ‘Now Isaac loved Esau, because he
did eat of his venison; and Rebecca loved Jacob.’ A complex story unfolds from
this. Shakespeare shows in Richard III
how Richard was a disfavoured son, a trouble to his mother, as she tells him
(Act 4, Scene 4), from birth onwards, presumably unlike his brothers. In Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen (1990
[1813]) points out that Elizabeth Bennet is her father’s favourite, while Lydia
This rich tradition
takes it as self-evident that the individual is indebted to his family but has
the task of moving beyond it. Family influence is not seen as ‘linear causality’.
Rather, traditional stories imply that an individual encounters crises, which
offer a challenge to transcend the family heritage. (See also, for example,
Tolstoy [1873–77], especially Part 2, Chapters 1–3; Olsen 1980 [1962]; Hopkins
1967.)
Psychotherapy has
drawn from this tradition. Freud acknowledged the great novelists and
playwrights as his precursors. He revered the book, Moderne Geister, by the Danish literary critic Georg Brandes
(1882, 1923 [1882]); and, as
it is contains various allusions to Kierkegaard, Freud probably read
Kierkegaard himself. Freud wrote his case histories, he said, ‘like novellas’ (GW 1: 227; SE 2: 160; PFL 3: 231;
our translation[2]), to illumine ‘the relation between Leidensgeschichte and Leiden Leiden
Jung (1912: 265–294; CW B: 266–293; CW 5: 274–305) wrote of ‘The battle for deliverance from the
mother’. The Jungian analyst John Layard (1944) sought to help a teen-age
girl by facilitating change in her whole family through analysing her mother’s
dreams.
Other psychotherapists studied whole
families, and tried to ‘treat’ the ‘illness’ of the individual by so-called
‘family therapy’ of his family. They made valuable findings (Haley and Hoffmann
1967; Handel 1968; Jackson 1968a,b; Framo 1972). But the family was described
as a ‘system’ (Jackson 1968 [1957], Haley 1967, Sonne 1967, Minuchin 1974,
Weichert 1975), or as an ‘organism’ (Bowen 1960: 346), with its own ‘family
pathology’ (Whitaker 1958: 208; Jackson, Riskin and Satir 1968 [1961]: 233;
Bell 1967; Haley 1967; Fleck 1976: 211; Sander 1979: 82). Szasz (1961),
however, insisted that ‘mental illness’ is a ‘myth’. And Laing (1962: 13)
wrote: ‘Family pathology is an even
more corrupt concept than individual psycho-pathology.
It simply extends the unintelligibility of individual behaviour to the
unintelligibility of the group’.
2. An existential perspective
Understanding families is not an optional extra,
for existential psychotherapists or those who consult them. The quest to understand
how one has responded to one’s family of origin, and to transcend it, is at the
heart of any existential search for self-knowledge.
Ludwig Binswanger is
regarded as the ‘father’ of ‘existential psychiatry’. Psychiatry has always
used compulsory intervention. But we understand by ‘psychotherapy’ a voluntary,
contractual relationship between consenting adults, as defined by Thomas Szasz
(1965). Binswanger threw some light on the relevance of families, but
introduced some confusion. He wrote phenomenological analyses of his
‘schizophrenic’ patients’ ‘worlds’. He described Jürg Zünd’s ‘upstairs world’
(with his parents), ‘downstairs world’ (with his grandfather, aunt and uncle),
and ‘street world’ (Binswanger 1957b [1946–47]; Sonnemann 1999 [1954]: 223–228;
Sadler 1969: 300–312). But Binswanger (1957a [1944–5]; 1958 [1944–5]) made next
to nothing of his own data showing Ellen West’s family’s interference with her
personal relationships. As Laing (1982: 55) points out, ‘it is not clear
whether [Binswanger] ever puts two and two together’ to ask if her experience
of the ‘swamp-world’, ‘grave-world’, and ‘ethereal world’ might be her
despairing response to her family’s invalidation of her, which she perhaps
lacked the insight to transcend.
Binswanger himself divided
human being-in-the-world in general into three ‘worlds’: ‘Mitwelt’ (‘with-world’), ‘Umwelt’
(‘around-world’), and what he called ‘Eigenwelt’
(‘own world’) (Binswanger 1942: 428). But he appears to have misunderstood
Heidegger’s term ‘Mitwelt’. ‘Mitwelt’ is not just one ‘world’, or
‘dimension’, among others. As Heidegger says (1986 [1927]: 118; 1962 [1927]:
155; 1996 [1927]: 112; our translation and brackets): ‘The world of Da-sein is with-world [Mitwelt]’. We are always already in the world with others. ‘Mitwelt’ needs no supplementing with ‘Umwelt’, ‘Eigenwelt’, ‘Überwelt’
(‘overworld’, to make room for spirit), or ‘Unterwelt’
(‘underworld’, to allow for Freud’s and Jung’s findings), for the simple reason
that it includes them. Even ‘private’ modalities of experience, such as dream,
imagination, sexual desire, ‘unconscious phantasy’, memory, transcendental
experience, are modalities of our being-in-the-world-with-others. Being in the
world with others is not one ‘dimension’ of being human. It is what being human
is.
The philosopher Max Scheler wrote (1954: 24 7): ‘Imbued as [the child] is with
“family feeling”, his own life is at first almost completely hidden from him.’
Heidegger said (1987: 208; 2001 [1987]: 163; our translation: the ‘American’ translation of Zollikoner Seminare omits the second sentence altogether): ‘The child is absorbed in
the comportment of the mother. It is absorbed in the ways of being-in-the-world
of the mother. It is exactly the opposite of having introjected the mother.’
Medard Boss (1954; 1963 [1957], 1975
[1971]; 1983 [1979]) and Gion Condrau (1998), who studied with Heidegger,
acknowledged in their case studies the relevance of family ‘upbringing’. Boss
wrote (1975 [1971]: 506; 1983 [1979]: 236; our translation): ‘… with no single
patient can one speak of his being schizophrenic per se. Rather, one must always ask: schizophrenic under the
excessive demands of what pattern of human relationships?’ But this still begs
the question of what ‘schizophrenic’ means.
Heidegger liked talking
with ‘schizophrenics’, and doubted that they were medically ‘ill’ (Wiesenhütter 1979: 158; Stadlen 2003b: 173–175). He revered the
poetry of the allegedly ‘mentally ill’ Hölderlin (Heidegger 1981, 2000 [1981])
and Trakl (Heidegger 1993a [1959a], 1993b [1959b], 1971a [1993a], 1982b
[1993b]). However, in a 1965 Zollikon seminar, while discussing critically a
case study of a ‘schizophrenic’ by Franz Fischer (1930), Heidegger (1987:
66–70; 2001 [1987]: 51–54) was silent on Fischer’s report (1930: 249–252) of an
‘unexpected’ visit to the ‘hospitalised’ patient by his father. (See also
Stadlen 2002: 169; 2003b: 173–175; 2003c.) The patient says (Fischer 1930:
249–250; our translation):
‘… I
don’t know you. Are you the father? … He looks like my father, but false and
not real, perhaps made of mist or painted air, a great deception against me …
How long have I been here? … Perhaps I’ve already been here longer than my
father is actually old…’
Fischer analyses the
patient’s alleged ‘disturbance’ of ‘thought’ and ‘space-time structure’, but
does not consider the possibility that the patient might be stating accurately
what he feels about his father. Fischer mentions the patient’s ‘internment’ in
the ‘institution’, but not the father’s necessary role in this. He does not say
how the father related to his son, or what he
said to him. Heidegger, Boss (1975
[1971]: 492–496; 1983 [1979]: 228–231), Paul J. Stern (1983 [1979]: xix–xx),
and the ‘phenomenological’ psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski (1995 [1933]:
269–270; 1970 [1933]: 288–289), all discuss this case of Fischer’s at length,
without mentioning the father, or the son’s ‘internment’. This is the standard
psychiatric tradition.
Yet Sartre had already
published Saint Genet, a lengthy
existential analysis of the writer, Jean Genet, in which he sought to discover
Genet’s ‘original project’, the fundamental existential choice he had made in
childhood as a way to live his family situation (Sartre 1952; 1964 [1952];
Laing and Cooper 1964: 65–90). Sartre had discussed the principles of
existential analysis of the ‘project’, anticipating his later work on Flaubert,
in Search for a Method (Sartre 1960a:
60–111; 1968 [1960a]: 85–166; Laing and Cooper 1964: 49–64).
Moreover, Bateson et al. (1956) had hypothesized that the
interactions in families of individuals diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ would be
characterised by the ‘double bind’, which they defined as an incongruity
between a communication and a metacommunication. The hypothesis was derived
from observation of individuals, not
of their families, but subsequent family studies tended to confirm the
prediction. (See also Jackson 1968b, Berger 1978.)
As Laing wrote (1961:
140–141; 1969 [1961]: 129), the work of Bateson et al. ‘revolutionized
the concept of what is meant by “environment”’. But Laing anticipated
Scheflen’s 1977 criticism that Russell’s (1956a [1908]) theory of logical types
was ‘not the best language’ in which to describe the ‘double bind’, to which
Bateson responded, ‘Maybe not…’ (Berger 1978: 97). Laing himself (1961: 162–170;
1969 [1961]: 145–153) analysed how Raskolnikov, in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, is driven frantic
by contradictory attributions and injunctions in a letter from his mother, the
day before he commits his murders.
Almost all family
studies still presupposed the existence of ‘schizophrenia’. It was regarded as
an ‘illness’, to whose ‘aetiology’ family interaction was a possible
contributing factor (Lidz, Fleck and Cornelison 1965). The family itself was
often described as ‘sick’ (Jackson and Satir 1961: 265).
The one exception was Sanity, Madness and the Family, by R. D.
Laing and Aaron Esterson (1964, 1970a [1964], 1970b [1964]). This book built on
the work of the Bateson group and other American family studies, but was also
informed by the existential tradition, including Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960b, 1976 [1960b]), and Szasz’s The Myth of Mental Illness (1961). It
reported the findings of Esterson’s research on the families of eleven
‘schizophrenic’ women. He pioneered the method of phenomenological study of all
subsets of each family. The case studies, containing extracts from his
tape-recorded interviews, make ordinary human sense of the women’s experience
and behaviour. The book reveals as the women’s praxis (Sartre 1960b, 1976 [1960b], Laing and Cooper 1964), her
intentional, intelligible activity, what the psychiatrists saw as ‘signs’ and
‘symptoms’ of an unintelligible process,
a medical-type ‘illness’, ‘schizophrenia’, ‘inside’ the person.
For example, one of the women, Mary Irwin,
aged twenty, explained (Laing and Esterson 1964, 1970a [1964]: 198–201; 1970b
[1964]: 211–214) that her mother would ‘just go on and on’. ‘She seemed to stop
me from thinking.’ ‘Tell you what I do, I sort of go rigid so nobody can get at
me.’ What the psychiatrists saw as her ‘catatonic’ behaviour, the outcome of a
meaningless ‘schizophrenic’ process, was simply Mary’s intelligible,
intentional act of self-protection, her understandable, purposeful praxis.
Mary’s sister confirmed this, both in the book (Laing and Esterson 1964, 1970a
[1964]: 201–202; 1970b [1964]: 214–215) and to us four decades later (interview
with A. Stadlen, 1 August 2001) after Mary’s death. (See also Esterson 1976.)
In The Leaves of Spring (1970, 1972
[1970]), Esterson studied in depth one of the families, the Danzigs, shifting
the focus from the daughter, Sarah, to the family itself. He showed that the
Danzigs saw Sarah as ‘sick’ for seeking autonomy rather than ‘ontic security’
and ‘alterated identity’ (concepts derived from Heidegger and Sartre,
respectively). Their family ‘harmony’ was an appearance of harmony, their
‘religion’ a search for respectability. They saw Sarah’s ‘thinking’ and serious
reading of the Bible as caused by the ‘illness’ they said she had.
These
existential-phenomenological case studies by Laing and Esterson show in
straightforward detail who is saying and doing what to whom. The families’ use
of language to define the being-in-the-world of the ‘patient’, by invalidation,
mystification, and subtle ambiguity, is made crystal clear. (See also Laing
1971, Hopkins 1967.)
This is a fundamental
advance on the vague, stereotypical summaries of patients’ families in Boss’s
case studies, for example. It is curious that, despite Heidegger’s dictum that
language is ‘the house of Being’ (1991 [1947]: 5; 1998a [1947]: 239; 1993c
[1959c]: 90, 111–118; 1982a [1993c]: 5, 21–28), the Daseinsanalysts have
neglected this field.
There is a noble
philosophical tradition of thinking on so-called ‘intersubjectivity’, better called
‘being-with’ (Heidegger 1987: 145; 2001 [1987]: 111) or ‘Thou-Thou relationships’ (Heidegger 1987:
263; 2001 [1987]: 210): Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Husserl, Scheler, Stein, von
Hildebrand, Heidegger, Ebner, Rosenstock, Rosenzweig, Buber, Marcel, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, Macmurray, Levinas. But this is not enough. The fine detail
revealed by Laing and Esterson attunes psychotherapists to aspects of an
individual’s Leidensgeschichte that
Freud, Jung, Binswanger, and Boss did not focus on.
This is the proper field of study for
existential psychotherapists. It goes to the heart of how an individual can
adopt a false or untenable existential position in relation to others under the
influence of some of those others.
Claire Church was
diagnosed as a chronic, institutionalised, ‘paranoid schizophrenic’. Laing and
Esterson give a careful analysis of the complex interaction between her and her
mother (1964, 1970a [1964]: 69–75; 1970b [1964]: 83–89). Claire told us four
decades later (interview with A. Stadlen, 3 January 2001) that her discussions
with Esterson, individually and with her mother, had enabled her to leave
hospital and pursue a satisfying career.
Recent writing (Goldstein and Doane 1985,
Tompkins 1995, Alanen 1997) offers a bland, ‘interdisciplinary’ approach to
‘schizophrenia’ and the family, endorsed by many ‘existential’
psychotherapists, for example, Yalom (1995). This approach sees ‘schizophrenia’
as an ‘illness’, and ‘family therapy’ as a ‘technique’, ancillary to compulsory
clinical psychiatry, to ‘improve the course of the disease’ (Tompkins 1995:
334). Such writing either ignores Laing and Esterson’s work, or implies that it
has long been assimilated and surpassed. In our view, Laing and Esterson’s work
has not been understood. The chronologically later writing is, existentially, a
retrogression.
Most clients who seek psychotherapy are
explicitly struggling to make sense of their family relationships, past and
present. Some clients are at first preoccupied with other relationships; but
their own attempts at understanding usually lead them spontaneously to start
reconsidering their family relationships from earliest childhood on. It is the
responsibility and privilege of existential psychotherapists to develop a
discipline to help clients in this quest.
The case study that
follows illustrates the way we work, which is informed by these principles. The
study has been intentionally written in everyday English, which is a language
overflowing with existential and phenomenological insight. Although we have not
used the terms we have just been discussing, such as ‘praxis’, ‘process’, ‘Mitwelt’, or ‘Leidensgeschichte’, we hope the reader will have no difficulty in
seeing how these are exemplified in the case.
3. Case illustration (by Naomi Stadlen)
Lucy, aged thirty-two, sought counselling
because she couldn’t decide whether to let her small son continue breastfeeding
at night. She said that her head ‘told her’ that a boy of eighteen months
should be weaned and sleep in his own bed, whereas her heart disagreed. But she
didn’t trust herself to decide because, she said, ‘I keep feeling that
something deep down is terribly wrong with me. It’s a very familiar feeling.’
All kinds of everyday situations would evoke this feeling. Lucy would feel
distressed until the feeling wore off.
At first, it sounded
as though Lucy’s difficulties related entirely to the present. The task of
counselling seemed to be to help Lucy explore the conflicting logic of ‘head’
versus ‘heart’. Yet this seemed premature. Lucy preferred to talk about weekly
events that troubled her. Nor was it helpful to encourage Lucy to experience
the full anguish of feeling ‘terribly wrong’. She seemed oddly relaxed in her
distress. It might therefore have been possible to challenge her calm as a form
of resistance, which prevented her from engaging more fully in life and in her
counselling. Was Lucy in bad faith, going through the motions of having
counselling while remaining untouched? The evidence did not support such an
interpretation. Lucy always came on time, and usually wanted to discuss a
current problem. She seemed to be ‘voting with her feet’, and for some time
that seemed to be all she could manage.
Like most clients,
Lucy talked spontaneously about her parents and her childhood. At one session,
Lucy said she had ‘nothing to say’. ‘Really nothing?’ I asked. She replied: ‘I
feel I’ve said everything already.’ I asked: ‘When did you say it?’ She
explained that her mother had been visiting, and had followed her in and out of
rooms, talking constantly. ‘Is that when you said everything?’ I asked. Lucy
suddenly realized that she herself had hardly said anything. Her mother had done the talking. ‘When she
talks, she never stops, and I can’t hear my own voice,’ she said. She was
shocked to realise this and wondered whether she really had any voice of her
own. ‘I never have my own opinions,’ she said. ‘When something new happens, I
have to ask other people what they
think. I haven’t got an opinion of my own.’ She was in despair and could not
imagine speaking with her own voice.
To reach this
realisation took more than a year. Most of what I did was to listen, remember,
and ask questions to help her to explain what she meant. So that, even while
she said that she seemed to have no voice of her own, she was struggling to
voice her difficulty. Talking to me like this was a new venture for her, and
her ‘heart’ felt it was right, while her ‘head’ accused her of ‘navel-gazing’
and fruitless introspection.
Even so, she needed a long time before she felt ready to say any
more about her statement that ‘there must be something terribly wrong with me’.
What seemed to make this so difficult was the corollary it implied: that, if
there were not something wrong with her, then there would have to be something
wrong about her parents, and therefore about her entire perception of life
which she had based on theirs. Lucy said that her parents presented family life
to her as ‘a beautiful picture’. ‘I bought their picture,’ Lucy said. At first,
the idea of radically questioning this picture was so far-reaching that Lucy
preferred to doubt herself, even if this meant devaluing countless
contradictory feelings and observations of her own.
Lucy described her
parents as a highly educated and cultured couple, so she could find plenty of
evidence to confirm the ‘beautiful picture’. In her childhood home, anything
that did not fit into this picture was simply never acknowledged. For example,
she told me: ‘I was expected to be good at school.’ Yet, even in the first
class, because her parents only acknowledged some perceptions but not others,
Lucy, at five years old, felt a nameless and terrifying confusion about what
she was ‘supposed’ to perceive. She was afraid to learn, she was terrified that
this meant there was something wrong with her, she was puzzled that other
children were apparently so at ease, and she felt in despair at failing her
academic parents. She settled for pretending, and created the impression of an
intelligent and well-adjusted child, as good a match as she could manage to the
parental picture.
Dramatic events
occurred in the family story. However, Lucy’s difficulty lay in finding the
words to substantiate her continual sense that something was ‘terribly wrong’,
even in her most ordinary and everyday interactions. As her family did not talk
about conflict and difficulties, Lucy had no vocabulary that she could use to
help hold on to her feelings.
She would often
describe her small son’s ‘difficult’ behaviour. However, when we discussed how
he might feel, his ‘difficult’ behaviour made sense. This led her to compare
his childhood with hers. Her parents had not listened to her feelings in her
childhood or even thought that she had any. Now she started to reconsider some
of her own previously devalued childhood observations and feelings. I used to
suggest possible reasons why she might have felt as she did, and then she, with
integrity, would separate what ‘feels absolutely right’ from what, as she
politely put it, ‘might be right’.
Slowly, her own feelings and observations began to connect together as crucial
parts of her whole coherent story. This gave her a completely different picture
of herself. Slowly she started to rethink everything, her entire ‘picture’. She
also wanted to make sense of her parents, and their parents in this new way.
She was fascinated that so much made sense, but shocked at how much the
parental picture had left out. Often, the ‘beautiful picture’ would seem so
much more attractive than the untidiness of her own honest feelings and
observations, and she would succumb to the seductive pull of thinking that,
after all, there must be something terribly wrong with herself.
However, connecting
together her honest feelings enabled her to feel more whole. Even her failures
of memory made sense. ‘I suppose there’s a lot I don’t remember because it
didn’t feel like me,’ she observed. Once she saw how she had settled for
pretending, as a child, to be someone she was not, she kept noticing how much
she was still living that pretence as an adult. But, because she had started to
value her real feelings and observations, the old pretence felt intolerable.
Connecting with her past gave her the understanding to face difficult moments
when she chose to transgress an unspoken parental prohibition, and to take
responsibility for her own perceptions. This gave her a voice that was distinct
from her mother’s. However, her voice had no language. She wanted to voice
ideas that she had been taught to overlook as a child. It was her lack of
vocabulary that made it so easy to think that ‘there was something terribly
wrong with me.’ She felt she had a vacuum where everyone else seemed so
articulate. Slowly, she began to use simple words to address interpersonal
difficulties that arose with her husband and children. The question of ‘head’
versus ‘heart’ seems to have resolved imperceptibly, as she began to respond as
a more whole person. Her husband (whose childhood family she described as
having its own methods of avoiding confrontation) overheard Lucy having an
honest dialogue with their son, and commented to Lucy: ‘I like the way you
talk.’
4. Critical considerations
Family interactions are complex. Yet, once a
client starts to understand them, details fall into place, and the client is
freed to decide how to use this new understanding.
‘Existential’
psychotherapists often do not understand what understanding is. They see their
clients’ attempts to understand as a search for ‘linear causality’. They
disdain questioning and attending to detail. Yet Heidegger said (1954a: 44;
1977a [1954a]: 35; our translation): ‘Questioning is the piety of thinking.’
And (1957 [1953]: 157; 1961 [1953]: 172): ‘To know how to question means to
know how to wait, even a whole lifetime.’ Therapist and client need patience
and perseverance to question, until the detail reveals its existential meaning.
This cannot be learned from books or taught in modules. Trainees need to
explore, through truly existential psychotherapy, their own family experience.
Few ‘existential’ training therapists or supervisors have attempted this
themselves.
It can be a shock to
examine one’s interactions, and to see, as both Elizabeth Bennet and Darcy
recognised, how one’s apparently clear perceptions may be utterly warped by the
restrictions of one’s family outlook. Both Elizabeth and Darcy felt ashamed
when they first took moral responsibility for their actions. Both despaired of
one another’s love, because of their new understanding of their earlier
actions. Jane Austen shows that their love for one another depends on their new
self-knowledge.
‘The novel,’ wrote D. H. Lawrence (1936: 528; also quoted by Leavis
1965–66: 7), ‘is the highest example of subtle inter-relatedness that man has
discovered.’ Will the insights of existential psychotherapists into family
relationships ever be good enough to challenge this claim?
Further reading
Note
Readers may be surprised that
most of our recommended reading stems from the 1960s and 1970s. Present-day
writing ignores or patronizes these works, without, in our view, understanding
them. As we stated at the end of section 2, the chronologically later works
are, in existential terms, a retrogression.
Anonymous [actually, Murray Bowen]. ‘Toward the differentiation
of a self in one’s own family’. In Framo, J. L. (ed.) Family Interaction: A Dialogue between Family Researchers and Family
Therapists.
J. Hopkins. Talking
to a Stranger: Four Television Plays.
R. D. Laing & A. Esterson. Sanity, Madness and the Family: Families of Schizophrenics.
T. Olsen. Tell Me a Riddle.
L.
Tolstoy. Anna Karenina (Especially
Part 2, Chapters 1–3.).
See Bibliography, below, for full details of these recommended writings.
See Bibliography, below, for full details of these recommended writings.
Naomi Stadlen has practised since 1991 as an existential counsellor and
psychotherapist, specialising in work with parents of small children. She has
practised for twenty years as a breastfeeding counsellor. She teaches and
supervises psychotherapy at several London
Anthony Stadlen has practised since 1970 as an existential-phenomenological
psychotherapist with individuals, couples and families. He teaches and
supervises at several London Freud Museum , London
Acknowledgements
We thank Professor Emmy van Deurzen, Mr Richard Skues, and Professor
Thomas S. Szasz for their constructive criticisms and suggestions.
[1] In Volume 2,
Chapter 13; or, in some editions, Chapter 36.
[2] We refer to standard English translations
where available, but give our own
translations.
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