Thomas Szasz. Obituary. Existential Analysis (January 2013)

Thomas Szasz


Anthony Stadlen

Thomas Szasz
s 90th-birthday seminar

Inner Circle Seminar No. 153
London, 13 June 2010

Photograph copyright
Not to be used without permission

Copyright © Anthony Stadlen 2013, 2020
Existential Analysis 24.1 (January 2013): 7-18.
[See also my obituary of Szasz in The Guardian:]

The Hungarian-American psychiatrist and writer Thomas Szasz, who has died aged ninety-two, is regarded by many as the leading twentieth- and twenty-first-century moral philosopher of psychiatry and psychotherapy. Others see him as a dangerous and seductive influence, advocating neglect of some of society’s most helpless members.
Szasz had a deep faith in human freedom. Human beings, he said, are free agents, fully responsible for their actions – not passive ‘patients’, whose ‘behaviour’ is ‘caused’ by their brains, or by ‘mental illness’. His faith in freedom led him to a deep sympathy with existential thinking. However, he denounced any incursions on civil liberties in the name of psychiatry and deplored that most existential therapists did not do likewise.
In the best known of his thirty-five books, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (1961)[1], Szasz argued that mental health and mental illness are alienated, pseudo-scientific, pseudo-medical terms. He maintained that the term ‘illness’, in the modern, scientific sense, cannot be applied to ‘minds’ except as a metaphor. A bodily organ, the heart, can be diseased; but to be heartsick or homesick, though real enough, is not to be medically, but only metaphorically, ill. Equally metaphorical, said Szasz, were such supposed mental illnesses as hysteria, obsessional neurosis, schizophrenia, and depression.
Having discussed Szasz with a great many people over half a century, and having read much of what has been published about him during this time, I have found that most of his admirers and advocates, as well as most of his adversaries, misunderstand him. For example, many who claim to be influenced by him, including many existential therapists, call themselves ‘mental health workers’. They talk about ‘mental health issues’, while claiming that they are following Szasz in not using what they call ‘pathologising labels’ such as ‘mentally ill’. They seem to assume that he was merely urging a kind of politically correct euphemism, like the bizarre term ‘service user’ they use for incarcerated, compulsory, psychiatric ‘patients’ no less than for voluntary ones. But Szasz discarded the discourse of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ more than half a century ago, simply because he saw it as a mistake.
Szasz insisted that his analysis of the myth of mental illness – and mental health – was purely logical. A mental illness was like a square circle, not like a unicorn. One might discover a unicorn, but one could never discover a square circle or a mental illness.
To some, Szasz appeared almost frivolously to ignore the anguish and incapacity of many. However, he went on to point out the empirical, ethical and political implications. His primary concern was the use of the myth of mental illness, not just to describe, but also to prescribe. He saw it not as an innocent mistake but as a socially and politically motivated act of bad faith. It gave false legitimacy to compulsory psychiatry coercing the innocent and the insanity defence excusing the guilty. He denounced these complementary uses of psychiatry as crimes against humanity, and called for them to be legally abolished.
He wrote[2]: ‘The Myth of Mental Illness was intended to be more than just an academic exercise in semantics. It was also intended to be a denunciation of the moral legitimacy of the most violent method that the modern state possesses and wields in its perpetual effort to domesticate and control people, namely, depriving innocent individuals – with the full support of physicians and lawyers – not only of liberty but of virtually all their constitutional rights, in the name of helping them.’
He defended an individual’s right to buy, sell and take drugs; to give informed consent to ‘treatment’, such as drugs, electroconvulsive therapy or even destructive psycho-surgery; and to engage in consensual, contractual psychotherapy. But he pointed out that, even if any of these made the individual feel better, this did not prove that he or she had been ill. If someone diagnosed as mentally ill should turn out to have a brain disease, then this would be a genuine physical illness, not a metaphorical mental one, and should be treated by neurologists, not ‘treated’ by psychiatrists.
Szasz’s opponents said he was so obsessed with abstract justice, freedom and responsibility that he denied the ‘medical problems’ of ‘suffering patients’ whose ‘mental illnesses’, so it was claimed, made them unable to take responsibility. But Szasz was deeply concerned with human suffering. His point was that suffering was not necessarily a medical problem, did not imply lack of responsibility, and should not be forcibly ‘treated’. Forcible ‘treatment’ did not imply the person ‘treated’ was suffering – except, very likely, from forcible ‘treatment’. Indeed, almost every week desperate involuntary ‘patients’ wrote to him as the only person they trusted to understand their predicament.
He saw compulsory psychiatry, no matter how ‘compassionately’ intended, as patronising and infantilising. Many observers have found that his early descriptions of the ever-increasing medicalisation of many human situations – what he termed the ‘therapeutic state’[3] – remain uncannily accurate in the new millennium.
But it is not generally realised how committed he was to voluntary psychotherapy. At an Inner Circle Seminar in 2007[4] he said: ‘Psychotherapy is one of the most worthwhile things in the world.’ In The Myth of Psychotherapy: Mental Healing as Religion, Rhetoric, and Repression (1979 [1978])[5] he wrote that Freud had misdescribed psychotherapy as a science and medical treatment. But Szasz revered the possibility Freud had opened up, of searching conversation between consenting adults. However, Szasz saw most psychotherapists as confused, prostituting their potentially noble art by making it the handmaiden of psychiatry. But he affirmed the right of consenting adults to engage in even the silliest forms of psychotherapy, provided it was voluntary. And he practised and promoted what he regarded as true psychotherapy, in which there was no ‘psyche’ and no ‘therapy’. He tried new names for it, such as ‘iatrologic’[6] and ‘autonomous psychotherapy’[7], but he disliked pretentious terminology. Szasz approved of child welfare, but, since children cannot give consent, he denounced ‘child therapy’ as child abuse[8] and child torture.
Born in Budapest on 15 April 1920, Thomas Szasz was the son of a Jewish businessman-lawyer, Julius, and his wife, Lily. His preoccupation with liberty began when, as a boy of six, he was forced to go to school. On long walks, he was shown prisons, hospitals – and mental hospitals, which he thought, even as a child, should also be called prisons. By adolescence, he found that ‘inquiring into the justification for locking up mad people is taboo. Crazy people belong in madhouses. Only a crazy person would ask, why?’[9] He thought, even then, that mental illness was not an illness. He never had to give up a belief in mental illness, since he had never had such a belief.[10]
He wrote to me that, as a boy, he was moved by how, in Mark Twain’s novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn[11], ‘an ignorant child, Tom Sawyer – another Tom S.!, – could recognise the evil of slavery, though the adults could not’.[12] Later, Szasz wrote detailed comparisons of compulsory psychiatry to slavery in Psychiatric Slavery: When Confinement and Coercion Masquerade as Cure (1977) and Liberation by Oppression: A Comparative Study of Slavery and Psychiatry (2002)[13], and to the Inquisition in The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement (1970)[14].
By 1938, Hungary had sided with Nazi Germany, and the family moved to Cincinnati, Ohio. At the University of Cincinnati, Szasz graduated in physics in 1941 and medicine in 1944. He trained at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, earning his diploma in 1950, and then worked on its staff for five years from 1951, undertaking military service at the US naval hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, during the last two. Franz Alexander, with whom he wrote psychoanalytic papers on psychosomatic medicine, was grooming him for the succession as Director of the Chicago Institute, but Szasz told me that he ‘felt viscerally upset’ by ‘the dehumanised language of psychiatry and psychoanalysis’[15]. He made sure he never in his entire life had to ‘treat’ an involuntary ‘patient’, and looked for a teaching post in a provincial university.
He settled in the Upstate Medical Centre of the State University of New York, in Syracuse, as professor of psychiatry, becoming emeritus in 1990. He did not publish his heretical ideas on mental illness until he had obtained tenure. He taught psychiatry, he said, as an atheist might teach theology.
Szasz called himself an ‘out-and-out atheist’, but he said his atheism was ‘religious’. He and I agreed that existential thinking had to start from the axiom that human beings whether or not made in the image of an ineffable God are ineffable in the sense that they can not be ultimately described by a system or a science. ‘And therefore,’ he said, ‘psychotherapy is ineffable’.[16] It was a secular form of the ‘cure of souls’. He said psychotherapists were more like rabbis or priests than like medical doctors. He held that confidentiality should be absolute, as in the confessional. It was no business of third parties, or the state.
In 1965 Szasz published two of his most original and refreshing books: Psychiatric Justice[17] and The Ethics of Psychoanalysis:  The Theory and Method of Autonomous Psychotherapy[18].
Psychiatric Justice (1965) is a careful analysis of the insanity defence. Szasz asks under what circumstances someone accused of a crime may reasonably be found incompetent to stand trial. The book repays close reading, as it is often supposed that Szasz demanded that everyone accused of a crime should stand trial. This is quite untrue. His point is that ‘mental illness’ should not be a ground for denying the right to trial or for requesting to be excused trial. However, he states many possible legitimate grounds for finding someone incompetent to stand trial, and he discusses who would be best placed to assess them. He is certain only that the assessors should not be psychiatrists.
The book contains wonderful excerpts from the transcript of a 1962 court hearing to determine whether ‘Mr. Louis Perroni’ was competent to stand trial. For example[19], the Assistant District Attorney, for The People, asks Szasz, as expert witness: ‘Do you think everybody is against Mr. Perroni in this case?’ Szasz replies:

‘On the contrary, I have just tried to explain that everybody is for him. You should be against him and then he could stand trial. This is my point. You shouldn’t be for him; be against him. Let Mr. Gross be for him and me. Don’t let Dr. Lipsky be for him, but let him be his adversary. I believe in the American adversary system of justice. It may be old-fashioned but I believe in it.’

  Szasz, a refugee from fascism and Nazism, believed passionately in Anglo-American democracy, freedom and justice. He was deeply dismayed by the corruption of the democratic, adversarial system by totalitarian, inquisitional psychiatric thinking and practice. The Assistant District Attorney’s incomprehension of Szasz’s love of democracy can be seen in the following exchange.[20] The lawyer quotes a passage[21] from The Myth of Mental Illness:

Q.  The sentence…is: ‘Lincoln said, “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is not democracy.”’
A.  I like that.
Q.  You like that statement?
A.  I like that statement.
Q.  Who said that?
A.  Lincoln.
Q.  Lincoln said that?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And then you differ from Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy in your book, is that correct?
A.  That is not correct.

  Szasz placed at the head of each chapter in Psychiatric Justice an epigraph from Camus’s essays against fascism in Resistance, Rebellion, Death[22] or from his book The Rebel[23].
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1965) was one of Szasz’s own favourites among his books. It is a fundamental contribution to thinking on existential psychotherapy. It is typical of Szasz that, having subtitled it The Theory and Method of Autonomous Psychotherapy, he wrote in his preface to the 1988 edition: ‘there is – there can be – no such thing as a…psychotherapeutic method’! But in no sense was he repudiating his book. I have been greatly helped by it, as have other psychotherapists. It is invaluable in clarifying, among other things, how not to get into a false position with clients.
I shall draw on some of what he called our ‘years of fruitful conversation’[24] because he said that I was the only person with whom he had ever been able to talk about psychotherapy.[25] When I drew his attention to the writings of Peter Lomas, who had just died, he wrote: ‘I didn’t realize there were three of us. (Well, four, counting Esterson.)’ [26] But he thought even Lomas wrote too ‘gingerly’ about medicalisation, although (wrote Szasz): ‘Honesty shines through his writing’.[27]
I apologise for quoting my own words, but his endorsement of them throws light on his position in relation to existential analysis. I wrote in connection with an Inner Circle Seminar, ‘Freud as Existential Analyst’[28], last year:

Existential psychotherapy and psychoanalysis are often taught nowadays as if they were diametrically opposed disciplines. But this is a tragic misunderstanding: an ill-informed and destructive splitting. The pioneering existential analysts were psychoanalysts. Medard Boss wanted Daseinsanalysis to be nothing other than a ‘purified’  psychoanalysis[[29]] – ‘purified’  of pseudo-science. Despite his scientistic and medical-psychiatric aspirations, Freud – at his best – was a true existential pioneer. Existential psychotherapy is gravely limited unless it is informed by the crucial phenomenological findings of psychoanalysis (though it should indeed jettison Freud’s ‘metapsychology’, which he himself said was dispensable).

   Szasz wrote:

Good summary. As you know, we agree completely about this.[30]

   It goes without saying that, without my blessed discovery of Szasz in the early 1960s, I might never have got to the point of writing words with which he agreed.
In 2004, I gave a lecture in which I asked whether psychotherapists’ understanding of love was an advance on popular understanding, let alone on the Holiness Code [Leviticus 19] or on writers such as Shakespeare, Jane Austen and Tolstoy. I argued that

the language of mental health encourages people, even great thinkers like Freud and Jung, to talk in alienated ways.[31]

   He wrote to me that he ‘very strongly’ agreed. He added[32]:

Herein is our problem: How can one make a profession, how can one make a living, out of being simply human, in the sense of the Holiness Code? This was a problem for Freud and Boss, etc., and is a problem for all of us. It is a pseudoproblem, solved by our forefathers ages ago: being a rabbi is not a job, not a moneymaking profession. First, you have to do something practical – be a teacher, tailor. Then, in your spare time, you are a rabbi.

   In Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics (2004)[33], edited by Jeffrey Schaler, his views were challenged from various angles by leading psychiatrists and philosophers, and defended meticulously by Szasz himself, at such length that this can be seen as his thirty-sixth book. The book also contains an important and fascinating autobiographical account by Szasz of his early life and how he developed his ideas.
The same year, in Faith in Freedom: Libertarian Principles and Psychiatric Practices (2004)[34], he lamented that even leading libertarian thinkers of the left and right – John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek – held that the so-called mentally ill were not responsible for their actions and could legitimately be incarcerated and forcibly treated.
He and R. D. Laing are often wrongly linked as ‘antipsychiatrists’, but Szasz showed in Antipsychiatry: Quackery Squared (2009)[35] that Laing practised both the compulsory psychiatry and the insanity defence that Szasz deplored.
Szasz learned much from the existential tradition, especially from Kierkegaard and Sartre, as well as from Camus. Some existential therapists have learned from him, but too many get no further than accusing him of dualism. They claim he split mind from body and ignored the ancient holistic concept of illness. But Szasz was well aware of the ancient concept. He meant that mental illness is a metaphor relative to the modern natural-scientific, Virchowian concept of illness as cellular pathology, of the body-as-object, not the lived body. Szasz explained this in innumerable books and papers, most rigorously in Pharmacracy: Medicine and Politics in America (2001)[36]. He wrote to me that the ‘dualism’ accusation was a red herring. Even if he were a ‘dualist’, he asked, how would this justify coercive psychiatry and existential therapists’ collusion with it?
His last book, Suicide Prohibition: The Shame of Medicine (2011)[37], written when he was ninety, was a protest against suicide prevention, the primary justification for compulsory psychiatry. However, he was equally opposed to physician-assisted suicide, which he saw as yet another intrusion of medicine into living and dying.
Szasz was a courteous listener and greatly enjoyed dialogue. He preferred it to lecturing, although he was a brilliant speaker. He listened intently, relishing each question, often thanking the other person for such a good one. He published ten books (eleven with Szasz Under Fire) after turning eighty, and conducted three electrifying all-day Inner Circle Seminars[38] in London, in 2003, 2007 and 2010, the last at ninety, attended by exactly ninety people, the dialogue an incandescence of ninety birthday candles.
In dialogue, there was a chance to try to understand his interlocutor’s possible misunderstanding and to clarify what he himself was saying. This was at least as difficult a task as Heidegger’s in the Zollikon seminars. Although listeners to both men were curious and interested, they were often unprepared for the radical nature of what Heidegger and Szasz were saying. The seminar participants’ unexamined natural-scientistic and medicalistic assumptions (I do not mean the regular participants in the Inner Circle Seminars) often made it virtually impossible for them even to hear what the speaker was saying. They were disconcerted by what they heard, or thought they heard. They had not made the fundamental shift of thought that Heidegger and Szasz, in their different but related ways, had made. Since Szasz’s language was usually simple and colloquial, listeners often assumed they knew what he meant; and they found what they thought he meant shocking.
This was as true of many existential therapists as of other listeners. This may explain why, for example, one former senior officer of the Society for Existential Analysis called Szasz ‘a fascist’, and why another former senior officer of the Society called him ‘a little fascist’ (a nice distinction). It may explain why one member of the Editorial Board wrote to me, and circulated widely, an abusive and scatological email denouncing me for having invited Szasz to speak at an Inner Circle Seminar in 2003; and why another member of the Editorial Board wrote to me, and also circulated widely, an email demanding to know what, in view of my invitation to Szasz, I was doing on the Advisory Board of the Society for Laingian Studies (he had himself invited me).
Szasz had been invited to address a seminar and conference of the Society for Existential Analysis as early as 1989 and 1991, and he had himself been a member of the Editorial Board since 1994. I have described, in my paper ‘“A poor model for those in training”: The case of Thomas Szasz’ (2003)[39], how, despite the support for Szasz from Emmy van Deurzen, Ernesto Spinelli and myself, a number of existential therapists expressed suspicion and mistrust of Szasz from the beginning.
At the 2003 Inner Circle Seminar a psychotherapist and teacher said she was ‘angry’ because Szasz ‘supported slavery’. She lectured him at length about ‘drapetomania’, the ‘mental illness’, ‘discovered’ in the nineteenth century, that ‘explained’ the perplexing tendency of black slaves to try to escape. Szasz listened politely. Only when I intervened to tell her that she almost certainly would never have heard of ‘drapetomania’ if Szasz himself had not rediscovered and written about the literature on ‘it’ in his paper ‘The sane slave’ (1971)[40], did he confirm this. ‘So please don’t be angry with me about this,’ he said gallantly. ‘Be angry with me about something else.’
I have come across countless similar misunderstandings of him. Szasz himself wrote in Words to the Wise: A Medical-Philosophical Dictionary (2004) that people often brought arguments against him ‘founded on so successful a distortion of my position that it is virtually impossible to counter’ them.[41] However, he never gave up seeking new ways to do so.
Existential therapists often try to present Heidegger as profound and non-dualistic, Szasz as superficial and dualistic. I am not the only person who finds them both profound and both non-dualistic. For example, Keith Hoeller, a scholarly translator and editor of both Heidegger[42] and Szasz[43], is of the same opinion.
Heidegger observes that tears cannot be understood by natural science although their physical properties can be.[44] Szasz observes that a wedding ring cannot be understood by natural science although its physical properties can be.[45] Heidegger and Szasz are making the same point, and Laing made it too. It is not dualistic. The two ways of seeing tears or a wedding ring, the personal and the physical, are like the two ways of seeing a human being, as person or as organism, which Laing discusses in The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (1960)[46] published a few months before The Myth of Mental Illness. As Laing puts it, in the language of existential phenomenology, each of the two ways of seeing is a different ‘initial intentional act’[47]. Laing writes:

There is no dualism in the sense of the co-existence of two different essences or substances there in the object, psyche and soma.[48]

   Thus those existential therapists who accuse Szasz of dualism are wrong. The two ways of seeing, the two different intentional acts, that Heidegger, Szasz and Laing are defining, do not constitute a ‘mind-body dualism’. However, Heidegger and Boss still cling to the idea of Daseinsanalysis as medical, as I have discussed in my paper ‘“Medical Daseinsanalysis”’ (2005)[49].
There are a few existential psychotherapists who have a real understanding of Szasz’s work. But for the most part it appears that Szasz is misunderstood by existential therapists in the ways I have described above and in various papers.[50] And it is surely significant that not one of the sixteen or seventeen books Szasz published since the Society was founded in 1988 has ever been reviewed in this Journal.
But ordinary working people, who have nothing to do with psychiatry or psychotherapy or existential analysis, often understand immediately what Szasz was talking about. My wife, Naomi, asked the recording technician at Szasz’s all-day ninetieth-birthday seminar whether it had been a long day for him. He looked surprised at the question. His eyes lit up and he replied: ‘No, he’s very clear.’ It was obvious that he had been completely absorbed in listening. He told her that he did not normally listen to the content of what he was recording.
I found our decorator sitting in my consulting room, having downed tools in the kitchen, listening to the recording of Szasz’s seminar which I had left on. ‘He’s great, isn’t he?’ he said. ‘He really talks sense. Who is he?’
Szasz’s wife Rosine died in 1971. He is survived by his daughters, Margot and Suzy, by his grandson, Andrew, and by his older brother, George.

PS (2020) From my obituary of Szasz in Hermeneutic Circular
(October 2012)

After [Szaszs 90th-birthday] seminar [13 June 2010  Szasz conducts 90th-birthday seminar: The Myth of ...] I drove him to the Cotswolds, the Lake District, and then Edinburgh and Manchester where he spoke at psychiatric conferences, with young psychiatrists speaking in lifeless monotone behind their PowerPoints. He seemed the youngest, most virile person there. In Manchester, he said: I’m going to let them have it. I’ve got nothing to lose. And he did. I drove him to the airport and he kissed me good-bye, saying: This may be the last time we see each other.
But I was to spend two more short holidays with him in his home town, Manlius, NY. The last time, in May this year, our favourite breakfast place, Dave’s Diner, was full and we went somewhere that seemed rather dreary for our last brunch. He brooded on the dark view of the universe suggested by animals which trek hundreds of miles across the desert to water, only to be eaten by the predators awaiting them. We would often discuss the great existential questions, and he said: What’s the Jewish view on what it’s all for?’ I muttered something about people made in the image of God with free will to collaborate, or not, in the task of creation by loving their neighbours and strangers and leading a decent life. He looked around [Note, 2020: with an absolutely enchanting smile] at the hopelessly obese people stuffing their families with chips and whipped cream, and said: It’s been quite a successful project, don’t you think?
I was deeply moved that he saw the decency of these people. They would surely have come to the help of neighbours or strangers, if only to open the door with kindness and courtesy. This was our last meal together. He drove me to the airport and we said goodbye. He was going to drive Naomi and me to Niagara next time.

On 11 September I heard from Jeff Schaler that Tom had died. A few days earlier Tom and I had exchanged humorous emails. He must have been in excruciating pain, but he did not tell me. Then he didn’t answer an email. At the beginning of September, he had fallen and broken the tenth thoracic vertebra in his spine. He had refused to stay in hospital, accepting only a prescription for painkillers. On 8 September, at home, he had died. [Note, 2020: He had exercised the right he had so fiercely defended for so long, in particular in his last book: to take enough drugs to kill himself.] Had he not fallen, I think he could have gone on for years.

Thomas Stephen Szasz, psychiatrist and writer, born 15 April 1920, Budapest; died 8 September 2012, Manlius, NY.

An all-day seminar, Thomas Szasz: In Memoriam (Inner Circle Seminar No. 188), will be conducted by Jeffrey Schaler, Morton Schatzman and Anthony Stadlen on 3 March 2013 from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. at Durrants Hotel, London. For further information, contact Anthony Stadlen at or +44 (0) 20 8888 6857.


[1] Szasz 1961.
[2] Szasz 2004b: 175.
[3] Szasz 1984.
[4] Szasz 2007.
[5] Szasz 1979 [1978].
[6] Szasz 1979 [1978]: 208.
[7] Szasz 1988 [1965b].
[8] Szasz 2004a: 18.
[9] Szasz 2002: 14.
[10] Schaler 2004: 28.
[11] Twain n.d. [1885].
[12] Szasz to Stadlen (email).
[13] Szasz 1977, 2002.
[14] Szasz 1970.
[15] Szasz to Stadlen (email) 2004.
[16] Szasz to Stadlen (conversation, Bath, UK) 15 September 2007.
[17] Szasz 1965a.
[18] Szasz 1965b.
[19] Szasz 1965a: 134.
[20] Szasz 1965a: 129.
[21] Szasz 1961: 199.
[22] Camus 1961.
[23] Camus 1956.
[24] Szasz 2009: xi.
[25] Szasz to Stadlen (conversation, Bath, UK) 15 September 2007.
[26] Szasz to Stadlen (email) 14 February 2010.
[27] Szasz to Stadlen (email) 10 February 2010.
[28] Stadlen 2012.
[29] Boss and Holzhey-Kunz 1982 [1981]: 111.
[30] Szasz to Stadlen (email) 13 March 2012.
[31] Stadlen 2004.
[32] Szasz to Stadlen (email) 2004.
[33] Schaler 2004.
[34] Szasz 2004b.
[35] Szasz 2009.
[36] Szasz 2001.
[37] Szasz 2011.
[38] Szasz 2003, 2007, 2010.
[39] Stadlen 2003.
[40] Szasz 1971.
[41] Szasz 2004a: 128.
[42] Hoeller 1988, Heidegger 2000.
[43] Hoeller 1997, 2012.
[44] Heidegger 2001: 201.
[45] Szasz 1996: 140.
[46] Laing 1960.
[47] Laing 1960: 19-20.
[48] Laing 1960: 19-20.
[49] Stadlen 2005.
[50] Stadlen 2000, 2003, 2008.


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Szasz, Thomas (2003). On Psychotherapy. Inner Circle Seminar No. 73 (7 December 2003).
Szasz, Thomas (2004a). Words to the Wise: A Medical-Philosophical Dictionary. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Szasz, Thomas (2004b). Faith in Freedom: Libertarian Principles and Psychiatric Practices. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Szasz, Thomas (2007). Answering Your Questions. Inner Circle Seminar No. 117 (16 September 2007).
Szasz, Thomas (2009). Antipsychiatry: Quackery Squared (2009). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Szasz, Thomas (2010). Thomas Szasz conducts his 90th-Birthday Seminar: The Myth of Mental Illness 50 Years On. Inner Circle Seminar No. 153 (13 June 2010).
Szasz, Thomas (2011). Suicide Prohibition: The Shame of Medicine.. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Twain, Mark (n.d. [1885]). The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. London: Heirloom Library.

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