Essay Review
Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars:
The ‘American’ Translation
Anthony Stadlen
[Existental Analysis 14.2 (July 2003): 354-372. Slightly expanded.
A shorter version was published in Daseinsanalyse 18 (2002): 165-170.]
Copyright © Anthony Stadlen 2002, 2003, 2021
Zollikon Seminars: Protocols–Conversations–Letters
Martin Heidegger (Edited by Medard Boss). (2001).
Translated, with notes and afterwords, by Franz Mayr and
Richard Askay.
xxxiii + 360 pp, ISBN 0-8101-1832-7 (cloth), ISBN
0-8101-1833-5 (paper).
This
is the long-awaited English translation of Zollikoner
Seminare. Medard Boss, in the title of his Preface to it, calls it the
‘American’ translation. It translates the first edition, published in Boss’s
lifetime, but adds the preface by his widow, Marianne Boss-Linsmayer, which is
the only addition to the second edition (Heidegger 1994 [1987]).[1]
The present article[2] confines itself to addressing the quality of the translation and the scholarship of the
translators’ notes.[3]
Professors
Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, professors of philosophy at the University of Portland
Readers
will learn much about the Zollikon seminars, the conversations and the letters.
Many passages read well. The seminars of 6 and 9 July 1964, the only ones where
the awkward dialogue between Heidegger and the seminar participants was
transcribed verbatim for the German edition (by Dr Erna Hoch, as she told me),
come memorably to life in English. The remarkable seminar of 12 March 1965 , where
Heidegger invites each participant to ‘make-present’ the Zurich Taormina 21 January 1965 , with
Heidegger’s extraordinary discussion of a 1930 case study of a ‘schizophrenic’,
are on the whole quite well translated.
However,
there are many occasions where this translation and notes fall short, to put it mildly, of
acceptable standards of translation and scholarship.
Heidegger
writes to Boss that the ‘theme’ of a ‘psychologists-congress’ is ‘reichlich
komisch’ (S. 319, p. 254).[4] Even the reader with no German
will guess, rightly, that this means ‘richly comic’. But these translators translate
it as ‘rather humorous’. They thus humourlessly distort Heidegger’s sardonic
humour about the ‘psychologists’ and their ‘theme’ into a tribute to the psychologists’
supposed ‘humour’.
In a
footnote on the very first page of the text of the translation (p.3), the
translators wrongly render Heidegger’s term ‘Lichtung’ as ‘“lighting” or “clearing”’.
But they themselves correctly translate Heidegger’s explanation (S. 16, p. 13) that
‘Lichtung’ has ‘nothing to do’ with ‘Licht’ (‘light’) but comes from ‘leicht,
frei machen’ (‘to lighten, make free’).
In
one of his last published letters to Boss, on 21 February 1971 , the eighty-one-year-old
Heidegger, himself (according to Boss) too frail to attend any more seminars, recommends which of
his books participants should start with. The translators owe it to readers, as
well as to Heidegger and Boss, to get this right, if nothing else. Heidegger
suggests What Is Called Thinking?
(1971 [1954], 1972 [1968]) and The
Principle of Reason (1992a [1957], 1991 [1957]). He says (S. 361, p. 290) they will make a contrast
with ‘the causality of natural-scientific thinking’ (my translation).
Heidegger goes on: ‘Schließlich die Schrift “Gelassenheit” (Neske) mit
dem “Feldweggespräch”’ (S. 361). In my
translation: ‘Finally the short book “Gelassenheit” (Neske) with the “Feldweg
conversation”’. The slim volume, Gelassenheit,
published by Neske (Heidegger 1992b [1959]), translated as Discourse on Thinking (Heidegger 1969 [1966]), contains both the memorial address,
‘Gelassenheit’, for the Meßkirch-born composer Conradin Kreutzer, and the dialogue, ‘Zur Erörterung der
Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken’, which Heidegger calls
the ‘Feldweggespräch’ (‘conversation on the Feldweg’). ‘Gelassenheit’, an old
term used by Meister Eckehart, means ‘releasedness’, ‘composure’, ‘serenity’.
The ‘Feldweg’ (‘fieldpath’) is Heidegger’s beloved walk through the fields from
his birthplace, Meßkirch.
Heidegger
thus recommends starting with these three books which contrast meditative and
calculative thinking.
The
translators’ version is: ‘Finally, the book Gelassenheit
could be contrasted with the Feldweggerspräch’
(sic, p. 290). Apart from the
misspelling of ‘Feldweggespräch’, the words ‘could be contrasted’ are pure
invention. All Heidegger says is ‘with’. Why would he want students to contrast
his whole book with its second half? The translators compound the muddle by
falsely indicating, in a footnote to the so-spelled ‘Feldweggerspräch’, that this is the essay, later printed as a short
book, Der Feldweg (Heidegger 1989
[1949]). But Der Feldweg is
Heidegger’s meditation on the Feldweg itself, which is not a ‘conversation’ at
all. Why would Heidegger want students to contrast Gelassenheit and Der Feldweg,
two essays in meditative thinking?
Incidentally,
in Heidegger’s letter to Boss of 30 June 1955 from Meßkirch, a few months
before giving his ‘Gelassenheit’
address there, he writes that, when his brother, Fritz, and he have been
walking ‘on the Feldweg or through the woods, the world-bustle seemed to us
like a madhouse’ (S. 316, my translation). The translators render ‘Feldweg’ as
‘country road’ (p. 251), which misses the poignancy of the specific allusion.
The
translators misrepresent not just Heidegger, but also Freud and Boss.
The
publishers tell us, on the back cover of the paperback version, that Professor
Askay has published journal articles on ‘Freudian psychoanalysis’. But the
translators do not appear to know what Freud’s ‘Grundregel’ is (S. 282, p.
224). Had they only translated literally, we might never have guessed they did
not know. The standard translation of Freud’s ‘Grundregel’ is literal:
‘fundamental rule’. The rule states (my translation): ‘that one should
communicate without criticism all that comes to mind’ (GW 8: 373; SE 12: 107)[5]. It is central to
psychoanalysis. But, in this translation, ‘Freuds Grundregel’ (S. 282) is
mistranslated as ‘Freud’s basic approach [genetic-causal explanation]’ (p. 224,
translators’ brackets). This mistranslation misleads readers, and traduces both
Freud and Heidegger, by failing to convey Heidegger’s specific, though questionable,
criticism, in a discussion with Boss on 27 September 1968, that Freud’s fundamental rule is ‘far removed from a
phenomenological instruction’ (S. 282, p. 224, my translation).
There
are similar inaccuracies about Boss’s writings. The footnote to Heidegger’s
letter to Boss of 25
November 1950 mentions Heidegger’s participation in a congress at
which ‘Medard Boss über eine Kastrations-Therapie bei einem schweren
Fetischisten gesprochen hatte’ (S. 303). This means (my translation), ‘Medard
Boss had spoken about a castration-therapy with a severe fetishist.’ The
translators render this: ‘Medard Boss discussed a castration [complex] therapy
in a patient with a deep-seated fetish complex’ (p. 340, n. 1 to Part III , their brackets). They thus supply, not just
one, but two, ‘complex[es]’, neither of them mentioned by Boss. Presumably they
do so lest we suppose Boss means actual castration of an actual fetishist.
But
this is just what he does mean. The patient was, indeed, castrated, on Boss’s
recommendation.[6]
Boss described the case at the 66th congress of South-West-German
psychiatrists and neurologists, held from 2–3 June 1950 at Badenweiler. This
led to a debate, fifty-eight pages long, in the 1950–1951 volume of the
journal, Psyche. The editor, Alexander
Mitscherlich, reporting the first part of the congress, on Daseinsanalysis,
criticized Boss (Psyche, 4.4:
229–233). He also reported Heidegger’s contribution to the discussion (4.4:
234). Boss replied (4.7: 394–400), arguing that physical castration had
saved his transvestite patient from ‘total
spiritual castration’ (4.7: 399). The journal then
published lengthy comments of twenty-four eminent psychiatrists, including
Bally, Binder, Binswanger, Manfred Bleuler, Jung, Kemper, Schultz-Hencke,
Seitz, Staehelin, and von Weizsäcker (4.8: 448–474; 4.11: 626–635), with
responses by Mitscherlich (4.8: 474–477; 4.11: 640) and Boss (4.11: 635–640). Regine Lockot (1994: 300–314) published extracts in her
book, Die Reinigung der Psychoanalyse.
The translators could have learned about this affair, had they
inquired.
It is
possible to glean some black humour from comparing their error with a
complementary one. Jung’s English editors wrote (CW 8: 347)[7]: ‘The treatment ended with
the total castration of the patient by Dr. Boss, including amputation of the
penis with implantation of artificial labiae.’ Thus, while the translators of Zollikoner Seminare assume that this was
merely ‘therapy’ for a ‘castration complex’, Jung’s editors assert that Boss
concluded his ‘treatment’ by personally castrating his patient.
But
it is not amusing that readers will trust that the interpolations in the
translation are based on evidence, when we have seen that they are not.
The
translators claim: ‘The second edition of Der
Traum und seine Auslegung ... was published under the new title: “Es träumte mir vergangene Nacht…” … ’ (p. 245).
These are, of course, two completely different books by Boss, namely, his first
(1953) and second (1991 [1975b]) dream-books, translated respectively as The Analysis of Dreams (1957a [1953])
and “I dreamt last night…” (1977a
[1975b]).
Again,
in the translation, the little daughter of Boss’s ‘test case’, Regula Zürcher,
in Existential Foundations of Medicine
and Psychology (Boss 1975a [1971], 1983 [1971]), is referred to as ‘him’.
Heidegger refers to her as ‘das Kind’ and ‘ihm’. The pronoun should therefore
be ‘it’, or ‘her’ (S. 274, p. 219). It is, incidentally, both an anachronism
and incorrect to translate Heidegger’s reference to ‘Frau Zürcher’ as ‘Ms. Zürcher’
(S. 199, p. 155).
The
above examples all involve careless, and even reckless, scholarship. Other
footnotes are similarly misleading. For instance, ‘Mitscherlich’, in the same
letter of 25 November 1950 ,
is not ‘a famous German sociologist’, ‘W. Mitscherlich’ (S. 303, p. 240, n.).
He is Alexander Mitscherlich, the psychotherapist and editor of Psyche.
There
are many elementary errors of translation. In many instances, the English reads
so strangely that it is obvious something is amiss.
In
Boss’s Preface to the first edition, he writes that Heidegger hoped for much
from an association ‘mit einem Arzt, der sein Denken weitgehend zu verstehen
schien’ (S. X, 1st edn; S. XII , 2nd
edn). This means: ‘with a doctor who seemed largely to understand his thinking’
(my translation). The translators put it: ‘Heidegger had set great hope on an
association with a doctor and had a
seemingly extensive understanding of his thought’ (p. xvii, my italics). This
makes it sound as if Boss is claiming, conceitedly, that Heidegger has ‘a
seemingly extensive understanding’ of Boss’s ‘thought’. Why did this not alert
the translators to their mistranslation?
Two
pages later, Boss describes the interplay, in the seminars, of Heidegger’s
questioning and the students’ silence. He writes: ‘Many of the participants
seemed downright shocked and outraged that one permitted oneself to question in
such a way’ (my translation). The German is: ‘...
daß man so zu fragen sich erlaubte’ (S. XII, 1st edn; S. XIV, 2nd
edn). This is translated as: ‘… that such questions would be permitted
in the first place’ (p. xviii). Is Boss supposed to be saying that the
participants disapproved of some unspecified authority, perhaps Boss himself,
for permitting Heidegger to ask such questions?
A
typical combination of errors occurs in the translation of one of Heidegger’s
letters. He writes to Boss on 7
July 1969 that questioning the history of natural science ‘dient
nicht einem bloß antiquarischen Interesse der Wissenschaftsgeschichte’ (S.
357). This means (my translation): ‘does not serve a merely antiquarian
interest of the history of science’. Their translation reads: ‘does not merely
serve as a secondary, antiquated [antiquarisch]
interest in the history of science’ (p. 286, translators’ brackets). This does
not make sense. The ‘secondary’ is invented. ‘Dient’ with the dative means,
simply, ‘serve’, not ‘serve as’. ‘Interesse’ with the genitive means ‘interest
of’, not ‘interest in’. Finally, ‘antiquarisch’ means ‘antiquarian’, not
‘antiquated’. The German for ‘antiquated’ is ‘antiquiert’. The translators put
‘antiquarisch’ in square brackets after mistranslating it, as if to show that
this is some obscure Heideggerian neologism, for which they have sensitively
struggled to find an English equivalent. But these are all commonplace words
about which there is no doubt at all.
Heidegger
sends Boss, as a present for his sixtieth birthday, his preface to his record
of Hölderlin readings. This is difficult to translate, but the translators
compound its difficulty by not translating literally where possible. By trying
to be ‘poetic’, while ignoring syntax and meaning, they miss both poetry and
plain sense. Heidegger writes (S. 333):
Der Dank ist das
scheu verehrende, zustimmende Andenken an das Gewährte, und sei dies nur ein
Zeichen in die Nähe zur Flucht der uns schonenden Götter.
A first draft of
a reasonable translation might read:
Thanking is the shyly [or reticently]
reverential, assenting remembrance of what is granted, even if this be only a
hint towards nearness to the flight of the gods who spare us.
The translators
render it (p. 266, their brackets):
Thanking is the awe-inspiring,
reverential, accepting remembrance [Andenken] of
what was granted, and it is only a sign pointing toward the vicinity of the
fleeing gods, who are saving us.
This makes no
sense. How could ‘thanking’ or ‘remembrance’ itself be ‘awe-inspiring’? And
that is not what ‘scheu’ means. It means ‘shy’, or ‘reticent’. But here it is
an adverb, ‘shyly’, or ‘reticently’. ‘Zustimmende’ means ‘assenting’ rather
than ‘accepting’. The translators imply that ‘thanking’ is the ‘sign’. But ‘und
sei dies’ means ‘even if this be’, or ‘be this’. It does not mean ‘and it is’.
The ‘und’ is concessive, the ‘sei’ subjunctive. ‘Dies’, ‘this’, indicates ‘what
is granted’, not ‘thanking’. As for ‘in die Nähe zur Flucht der uns schonenden
Götter’, this speaks of ‘nearness’, not to ‘the gods’, but to their ‘flight’.
Also, ‘schonenden’ means ‘sparing’, not ‘saving’.
[Note (2020): Keith Hoeller, in his translation of Heidegger’s Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (2000: 225), had already excellently rendered this sentence:
Some of the passages of greatest significance for existential psychotherapists are mistranslated. The following examples, from seminars, conversations and letters, are in chronological order.
[Note (2020): Keith Hoeller, in his translation of Heidegger’s Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (2000: 225), had already excellently rendered this sentence:
Thanks is a shyly venerating, concordant remembrance of what is granted, be it even only a pointing
toward the nearness to the flight of the gods who have protected us.]
toward the nearness to the flight of the gods who have protected us.]
Some of the passages of greatest significance for existential psychotherapists are mistranslated. The following examples, from seminars, conversations and letters, are in chronological order.
Heidegger’s Taormina
For example,
Heidegger says of physiological explanations (S. 200):
Aus dem Faktum, daß durch chemische Eingriffe in das
als etwas Chemisches umgedeutete Leibliche etwas bewirkt werden kann, wird
geschlossen, daß der Chemismus des Physiologischen der Grund und die Ursache
des menschlich Psychischen sei. Dies ist ein Fehlschluß…
In my translation:
From the fact that something can be effected by
chemical interventions into the bodily reinterpreted as something chemical, it
is concluded that the chemistry of the physiological is the ground and cause of
the human psychical. This is a false conclusion…
The translators render the
first part of this as follows (p. 155, their brackets):
From the fact that human bodily being [Leibliche] is interpreted as something chemical and
as something which can be affected by chemical interventions it is concluded
that…
But ‘umdeuten’ means ‘to
reinterpret’, or ‘to change the meaning of’, not ‘to interpret’. ‘Bewirken’
means ‘to effect’, not ‘to affect’. Heidegger’s starting-point is that, in reality, ‘something can be effected
by chemical interventions into the bodily’. This is neither an interpretation
nor a reinterpretation, but a formidable fact
[Faktum]. Heidegger is saying that, from this fact, together with the fact
that ‘the bodily’ is ‘reinterpreted as something chemical’, the ‘false
conclusion’ has been drawn that ‘the chemistry of the physiological is the
ground and cause of the human psychical’. But the translators muddle the syntax
and make him appear to say that people conclude this from ‘interpret[ation]’
alone.
Heidegger goes on
to denounce Professor Prader for ‘simply transfer[ring] the concept of
“individual” and “individuality” from the human self to molecules’ (S. 200, my
translation and brackets). Heidegger calls this a ‘Schwindel’, i.e., a ‘swindle’. The translators
censor this, substituting the milder word, ‘deception’ (p. 156).
Heidegger’s Taormina
Es ist ‘draußen’ noch verhaftet in die Weisen des In-der-Welt-seins eines
anderen Menschen, seiner Mutter.
In my translation:
It is ‘out there’ still caught up into the ways of
being-in-the-world of another human being, its mother.
But the translators render
this (their brackets):
Even [when the child is] ‘out there’, he is still
tied to the ways of another human being’s being-in-the-world – his mother’s.
This translation makes
nonsense of what Heidegger is saying. ‘Even’ and ‘when’ are inventions.
Heidegger’s point is that the child is
‘out there’.
His Taormina
Das Wesentliche ist, daß ein im psychologischen Sinne ‘übertragender’
Mensch in einer bestimmten Gestimmtheit festgehalten ist…
In my
translation:
The essential [fact] is that a human
being ‘transferring’ in the psychological sense is held fast in a definite
attunement…
The translators’
version reads (p. 165):
It is essential that the human being,
engaging in ‘transference’ in the psychological sense, be retained as being in
a specific attunement…
They have changed
Heidegger’s straightforward indicative statement into a bizarre exhortation.
‘Ist’ means ‘is’, not ‘be’. And they have invented ‘as being’. They appear to
think Heidegger is urging that it is ‘essential’ that the idea of the ‘transferring’ human being ‘as being’ in a specific
attunement ‘be retained’. But he is simply stating, as an ‘essential’ fact, that the ‘transferring’ human
being is ‘held fast’ in such an
attunement.
In
the seminars of 24 and 28 January 1964, the first in Boss’s house that were transcribed,
Heidegger alleges (S. 6, p. 5):
…in Freuds Abhandlung über die Fehlhandlungen
sind solche Suppositionen die Strebungen und Kräfte. Diese
angenommenen Strebungen und Kräfte verursachen und bewirken die Phänomene.
In my
translation:
…in Freud’s treatise on the faulty
actions [parapraxes or mischievements] such suppositions are the strivings and forces. These assumed strivings and forces cause and produce the phenomena.
The translators translate
‘Strebungen’, not as ‘strivings’, or even as ‘trends’, Strachey’s Standard Edition translation of the
term, but as ‘drives’. They also claim, in a
footnote, that the ‘treatise’ Heidegger is referring to is The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. This translation and this
claim are both problematic.
The translation
of ‘Strebungen’ as ‘drives’ is wrong for the following reasons. The plural noun
‘drives’ occurs only once (Guttman et al.
1984) in the entire English Standard
Edition of Freud’s works, and there (SE
5: 657) it is a question of Freud’s ‘cab-drives’ with a ‘relative’, probably
Minna Bernays (Swales 1982). But ‘drive’ has often
been suggested as a better translation for ‘Trieb’, which the Standard Edition translates as
‘instinct’. The translators of Zollikon
Seminars correctly translate ‘Trieb’ as ‘drive’ when Heidegger criticizes
Freud’s ‘drive’ (i.e., ‘instinct’)
theory (S. 217–219, pp. 172–174). By translating ‘Strebungen’ as ‘drives’, they
make it appear that this is what Heidegger is talking about in the above
quotation, too. This is misleading, because, as Freud uses the terms, ‘the opposition of conscious and unconscious has no
application to the drive [Trieb]’ (GW
10: 275; SE 14: 177; my translation),
so that ‘Trieb’ is, in principle, unphenomenological, whereas ‘Strebung’ can
be, for instance, ‘ethical’ (GW 8:
56; SE 11: 52), and is in no way
inherently unphenomenological, though it can be on occasion (GW 15: 112; SE 22: 105).
Heidegger
himself appears aware that ‘Strebungen’ may be phenomenological. In a
conversation with Boss on 7
July 1966 at Zollikon, he says (S. 265):
Das, was man
psychologisch Strebungen nennt, spielt sich daseinsmäßig gesehen im Bereiche der
Sorge … ab…
The translators
render this adequately as (p. 212, their brackets):
Seen from the perspective of Da-sein,
what one calls “strivings” [Strebungen] in psychology take place in the domain of care [Sorge]…
So here they do
translate ‘Strebungen’ as ‘strivings’. But this only makes it more confusing when
they translate it as ‘drives’, especially as they do not then indicate that it
is ‘Strebungen’ that they are translating.
As
for the claim that Heidegger means the Psychopathology,
that work on the ‘parapraxes’ is indeed a ‘treatise’ (‘Abhandlung’), referred
to as such by Freud himself (GW 4:
179; SE 6: 162; my translation). But
the word ‘Strebungen’ does not appear even once in it (Guttman et al. 1995). ‘Strebung’ appears just
once (Guttman et al. 1995), in a footnote (GW
4: 60, n. 1; SE 6: 51, n. 2) added by
Freud in 1924 to this work published in 1901, but it is phenomenological,
autobiographical, from his own memories of childhood, not in the least
mechanistic. So, if Heidegger is
alluding to the Psychopathology, he
would appear to be pronouncing on a book he has not read.
However,
Heidegger’s reference to ‘assumed strivings [Strebungen]’ indicates that he is
thinking of a sentence from Part 1 (‘Parapraxes’) of the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (GW 11: 62; SE 15: 67):
‘Die wahrgenommenen Phänomene müssen in unserer Auffassung gegen die nur
angenommenen Strebungen zurücktreten.’ In my translation: ‘The perceived
phenomena must in our conception step back before the merely assumed
strivings.’ Binswanger (1947a [1936]: 165;
1963a [1936]: 156) drew attention to this sentence in his lecture for Freud’s
eightieth birthday; and, in his case of ‘Ellen West’ (1957a [1944–45]: 142,
150; 1958 [1944–45]: 319, 327), he called this sentence a ‘Grundsatz’
(‘fundamental principle’) of psychoanalysis. Binswanger, Boss, Heidegger,
Condrau, Holzhey-Kunz, Cohn have cited it in at least thirty books or papers
(Stadlen 2003a: 163–166, note 77; 174–176, Appendix).
A further allusion confirms that Heidegger has
this ‘Grundsatz’ in mind (S. 7, p. 7): ‘Nach welcher Hinsicht müssen gemäß Freud die Phänomene zurücktreten gegen die
Annahmen?’ In my translation: ‘In what respect must according to Freud
the phenomena step back before the assumptions?’ A translators’ note could have
clarified this.
In any event,
Heidegger is repeating the claim of Binswanger et al.
that the ‘Grundsatz’ shows Freud was no phenomenologist. But the claim already
depends on taking ‘Strebungen’ as speculative, mechanistic, unphenomenological
(Stadlen 1999; 2003a: 163–166, note 77).
Mistranslating ‘Strebungen’ as ‘drives’ further prejudices a fair evaluation.
The
seminars of 6 and 9 July 1964
are, as mentioned above, the only ones transcribed verbatim. Dr Erna Hoch, who
transcribed them, was an outstandingly honest reporter, who paid meticulous
attention to detail (see, for example, Hoch 1991). Heidegger’s lucid discussion
in the 9 July seminar, of human motivation as opposed to natural-scientific causality,
deserves to be read by all psychotherapists. The translators, however, introduce
some confusion by attributing to a seminar participant an allusion to ‘the
burgher-prince [and] the motive for the [criminal] act’ (p. 21, their brackets).
Who is this ‘burgher-prince’ and what has he to do with ‘the motive for the
[criminal] act’? Is he a character in some German Märchen or Novelle with
which the cultured reader is expected to be so au fait that no translators’ note is needed? In fact, the seminar
participant mentions, not ‘the burgher-prince’, but ‘Bürger-Prinz’ (S. 25), presumably the psychiatrist Hans Bürger-Prinz of Hamburg Hereditary Health Court
As
mentioned above, the seminar of 21
January 1965 , where Heidegger discusses Franz Fischer’s (1930:
249–252) case study of a ‘schizophrenic’, is mostly well translated. But there
is a flaw of a characteristic kind. Fischer describes the patient’s
‘Betrachtung des Uhrzeigers an einer Wanduhr’ (S. 66), i.e., his ‘contemplation of the clock-hand on a wall clock’ (my
translation). But the translators render this as ‘looking at the hands of a wall clock’ (p. 52, my
italics). They repeatedly translate ‘der Zeiger’ and ‘der Uhrzeiger’ as
‘hands’, although both words mean a single hand of the clock. The patient
himself refers to ‘hands’ only once, when he says that the clock jumps around
‘mit vielen Zeigern’ (S. 67), i.e.,
‘with many hands’. It is ironic that the translation distorts what the patient
says, when Heidegger is castigating Fischer for doing just that.
The
‘phenomenological’ psychiatrist, Eugène Minkowski, made the same error in his
French translation of the same passage from Fischer in Le Temps Vécu (1995 [1933]: 265). So did Minkowski’s translator in Lived Time (1970: 288) and Boss’s
translator in Existential
Foundations of Medicine and Psychology (1983
[1979]: 229). But many wrongs do not make a right. (See also Stadlen and
Stadlen 2005.)
In the seminar of
23 November 1965, Heidegger asks what Freud understands by analysis. The
following exchange occurs (S. 148, my translation and brackets):
S. [Seminar participant]: Freud means by that the
tracing back [Zurückführung] of the symptoms to their origin.
H. [Heidegger]: Why then does he name a tracing-back
[Zurückführung] analysis?
S.: In analogy to chemical analysis, and this also
indeed wants to go back [zurückgehen] to the elements.
H.: It would therefore be a matter of a reduction
[Zurückführung] to the elements in the sense that the given, the symptoms, gets
broken
up [aufgelöst] into elements with the
intention of explaining the symptoms by the elements thus obtained. Analysis in
the Freudian sense would therefore be a reduction [Zurückführung] in the sense
of the breaking up in the service of causal explanation.
Now, not every tracing-back
[Zurückführung] to a whence of being and persisting has to be an analysis in
the sense just stated.
The translators
render all five instances of ‘Zurückführung’ in the above extract as
‘reduction’ (p. 113). This distorts the meaning of the exchange. It is not
clear whether one or two seminar participants are speaking. But ‘Zurückführung’
is being used in two different senses: ‘tracing back’, which can be
existential-phenomenological; and ‘reduction’, of a causal-mechanistic,
reductive kind, not a phenomenological ‘Reduktion’. The translators collapse
the two meanings into ‘reduction’. This is itself a crude reduction.
Heidegger’s whole point is, as he says, that ‘not every tracing-back … has to
be an analysis in the sense just stated’, i.e.,
a reduction.
Heidegger
himself exploits the ambiguity of ‘Zurückführung’ to
claim Freudian analysis is reductive. He goes on (my translation):
Neither in Freud’s writings nor in
Jones’s biography of Freud is there to be found any passage where it emerges
why Freud chose just this word analysis as title of his theoretical attempt.
This is false.
The translators could, had they checked, have inserted a note to this effect.
Freud does ask, and answer, the question, ‘Why “analysis”?’
(GW 12:
184; SE 17: 159). ‘Because,’ he says (my translation), ‘such an analogy [with
chemical analysis] really stands up in an important respect.’ But he insists (GW 12: 186; SE 17: 161; my translation): ‘The psychical is something so
uniquely particular that no single simile can convey its nature. The
psychoanalytic work presents analogies with chemical analysis, but equally with
the incision of the surgeon or the intervention of the orthopaedist or the
influence of the educator.’
Heidegger’s
critique of Freud’s ‘theory’ is unrelenting, and not always soundly based on
Freud’s texts. Yet we know from Boss’s account (1982a
[1977b]: 214–215; 1988 [1978–79]: 9–10) that Heidegger shared, at least
to some extent, the warm appreciation Boss expressed in Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis (1963 [1957]) for the
phenomenological aspects of Freud’s practice. Boss and Holzhey-Kunz wrote (1982 [1981]: 111; my translation): ‘Daseinsanalysis
in itself wants to be nothing other than a purified [geläuterte]
psychoanalysis.’ Heidegger presumably takes this as read, and gets to work on
the ‘metapsychology’, which Freud himself said was dispensable (GW 14: 303; SE 20: 266). But some readers may conclude, wrongly, that Heidegger
and Boss are saying Freud can be dismissed. This translation, by mistranslating
Freud’s terms to make them appear more mechanistic and reductive than they are,
can only reinforce such an impression.
In
the same seminar of 23 November 1965, Heidegger returns to a recurring theme:
his indignation at Binswanger for accusing him of excluding love from his
thinking. Binswanger had presumed to ‘supplement’ Heidegger’s supposedly
‘dismal’ ‘care’ with ‘love’, the ‘dual mode’, ‘being-beyond-the-world’, and so
on. The earliest mention of this in Zollikon
Seminars is in Heidegger’s letter to Boss of 10 February 1953. He reports
that Binswanger was ‘armed with a gigantic manuscript [Riesenmanuskript] on
“[E]ccentricity”…. I stated my critique and clearly said, among other things,
that the analysis strikes me as very eccentric’ (S. 308, p. 245, their
translation, my brackets). The translators here accurately convey Heidegger’s
biting humour. But elsewhere they inexplicably flatten the strength of
Heidegger’s feelings. For example, in Heidegger’s conversation with Boss on 14 July 1969 , he says (S.
286, my translation): ‘Binswanger betrays [his] complete misunderstanding of my
thinking most crassly in his gigantic book…’. The translators render ‘am
krassesten’ (‘most crassly’) as ‘in the most striking way’, and they demote the
‘Riesenbuch’ (‘gigantic book’) to a merely ‘huge’ one (p. 227).
In
the same conversation, Heidegger (S. 286, my translation) misquotes Binswanger
as calling the subject-object split ‘das Krebsübel
der Psychiatrie’ (‘the cancerous evil of
psychiatry’). Binswanger, in his lecture, ‘On the daseinsanalytic
research direction in psychiatry’, had called it ‘the
cancerous evil of all psychology’ (1947b
[1946]: 193; 1958b [1946]: 193; my translation of title and text, my emphasis). It would have helped if the translators had
noted this and given the source. They render ‘Krebsübel’ as ‘cancer’ (p. 227), while Ernest Angel, in Existence (edited by May et al.), translates it as ‘fatal defect’
(Binswanger 1958b [1946]: 193). Neither of these is strong enough.
On 2
August 1969, shortly before his eightieth birthday, Heidegger sends Boss a
short text on Freud’s concept of ‘repression’. It is of fundamental importance
for psychotherapists and others seeking Heidegger’s views on ‘repression’.
Heidegger affirms repression, but as
‘an ecstatic-intentional world-relationship to things, living beings and fellow
human beings’, rather than as the outcome of ‘a psychical mechanics or
dynamics’ (my translation). He writes (S. 357):
In der Verdrängung
wird das den Menschen angehende so wenig beseitigt, daß es vielmehr den Verdrängenden
erst recht in einer besonders hartnäckigen Weise betrifft.
In my
translation:
In repression, what is concerning the
human being is so little got rid of that, much rather, it now really affects
the repressing [person] in a particularly obstinate way.
The translators
render it (p. 287):
In repression, what concerns the human
being is to avoid so little that it affects the one who tries to repress it in
an even more obstinate way.
The syntax is
quite wrong. Once again, it needs no knowledge of German to see that this is
nonsense.
In
the next example, a bracketed interpolation by the translators again destroys
the meaning of a sentence. Heidegger, aged eighty-two, in one of his last
conversations with Boss, on 2
March 1972 , discusses dreaming and waking (S. 288):
Man kann nicht
sagen, wenn man aufwacht, dann befinde man sich in derselben Welt, sondern
umgekehrt: das Aufwachen besteht gerade darin, daß einem die Welt als dieselbe
begegnet, die man gewohnt ist im Wachen.
In my
translation:
One cannot say, if one wakes up, then
one finds oneself in the same world, but rather the other way round: waking up
consists precisely in [the fact] that one encounters the world as the same that
one is used to in being awake.
The translators
render it (p. 228, their brackets):
When one wakes up, one cannot say that
he then finds himself in the same world [as in dreaming], but rather the other
way round: Waking up consists precisely in [the fact] that one encounters the
world as the same one he is accustomed to in being awake.
The
interpolation of ‘[as in dreaming]’ undermines the translation. Heidegger is
not here comparing the waking world to that of dreaming. He is saying that the
dreamer does not first ‘wake’, and then find himself in the same ‘waking
world’ as before. Rather, encountering the world as ‘the same’ is what waking is. This is fundamental. The passage as
a whole is one of the few where psychotherapists can study Heidegger’s own
words on dreaming and waking, rather than Boss’s.
[Note (2020): That is, if these really were Heidegger’s own words rather than Boss’s. It is disconcerting to compare this passage with the final chapter of Boss’s first dream-book. Many of the observations ‘Heidegger’ allegedly makes in his conversation with Boss in 1972, including this one, had already, miraculously, been made by Boss in his book of 1953. ‘Heidegger’ in 1972 even repeats Boss’s specific 1953 observation that a dream does not differ from waking as a fox does from an eagle. It is true that Boss, in that book, reports a number of dreams as evidence that dreams can be prophetic, but he modestly does not claim this for his book itself.]
It is again odd that the translators did not notice that their interpolation, ‘[as in dreaming]’, renders the sentence senseless.
[Note (2020): That is, if these really were Heidegger’s own words rather than Boss’s. It is disconcerting to compare this passage with the final chapter of Boss’s first dream-book. Many of the observations ‘Heidegger’ allegedly makes in his conversation with Boss in 1972, including this one, had already, miraculously, been made by Boss in his book of 1953. ‘Heidegger’ in 1972 even repeats Boss’s specific 1953 observation that a dream does not differ from waking as a fox does from an eagle. It is true that Boss, in that book, reports a number of dreams as evidence that dreams can be prophetic, but he modestly does not claim this for his book itself.]
It is again odd that the translators did not notice that their interpolation, ‘[as in dreaming]’, renders the sentence senseless.
A
little later, in the same conversation, Heidegger says (S. 288) [Note (2020): again, as Boss had done in 1953]:
Jedenfalls gehört
es nicht zum Wesen des Träumens, daß ich in dieselbe Welt ‘erträume’,
wie es zum Wesen des Erwachens gehört, daß ich in dieselbe Welt hinein erwache.
In my
translation:
In any case, it does not belong to the
essence of dreaming that I ‘adreamen’ into the same world, as it belongs to the
essence of waking that I awaken into the same world.
The translators put
it (pp. 228–229):
In any case, it does not belong to the
essence of dreaming ‘to dream’ in the same world as it belongs to the essence
of waking up, to wake up into the same world.
This misses the
point that Heidegger has coined a new word, ‘erträumen’,
which could be translated as ‘adreamen’, by analogy with ‘erwachen’, ‘awaken’.
The inverted commas round ‘to dream’ do not convey this. Also, ‘in’ with the
accusative means ‘into’, not ‘in’. And what is wrong with Heidegger’s ‘ich’
(‘I’)?
Heidegger
alludes in this conversation to various specific dreams, in addition to his own
‘Abitur’ (‘matriculation’) dream (Boss 1982a [1977b]: 218–220; 1988 [1978–9]:
12–13, 20). A translators’ note could have clarified these allusions. Boss, in
a note (S. 288, n. 1; p. 340, n. 1 to March 2, 1972), explains that the basis
of the conversation was the preparation of his second, 1975, dream-book, “Es träumte mir vergangene Nacht…” (1991
[1975b]), later translated as “I dreamt
last night…” (1977a [1975b]). The translators might have discovered the
source of these dreams, and informed readers, had they perused Boss’s two
dream-books and noticed that they are not different editions of the same book
(see above).
The
dreams are found in Boss’s first
dream-book, Der Traum und seine Auslegung
(1953), translated as The Analysis of
Dreams (1957a [1953]). Heidegger mentions (S. 290, pp. 229–230, my
translation) a patient of Boss’s who dreams that ‘a woman dressed in red is at
first dead and then finally in later dreams is dancing’. These dreams come from
a series of 823 dreamed by an engineer. In one dream there was an
‘unconscious’, not ‘dead’, woman dressed in red; and then, in a single later
dream, the dreamer danced and fell in love with a woman ‘similarly’ dressed in
blood-red (Boss 1953: 127; 1957a [1953]: 114). However, Boss himself at the end
of his book says the woman was the same in both dreams (1953: 235–236; 1957a
[1953]: 210). In the same paragraph at the end of the book, Boss mentions a
‘mountain-climber-dream’ in terms that tally with Heidegger’s remark, ‘Every
dreaming is a being-in-the-world and can have in itself a certain history (as e.g. with the mountain-climber-dream)’
(S. 290, p. 230, my translation). It is interesting that, when Heidegger
discussed Boss’s forthcoming dream-book with him in 1972, he cited these dreams
from Boss’s first dream-book, published nineteen years earlier.
[Note (2020): Though it is somewhat less impressive if the ‘Heidegger’ who speaks here is, as I have suggested above, none other than Boss himself. I do not mean to imply that Heidegger did not endorse Boss’s views or indeed contribute to them in 1953 and reaffirm them in 1972. It seems likely that, precisely because Heidegger did so that Boss felt justified in attributing his own 1953 words directly to ‘Heidegger’ in the conversation of 1972.]
[Note (2020): Though it is somewhat less impressive if the ‘Heidegger’ who speaks here is, as I have suggested above, none other than Boss himself. I do not mean to imply that Heidegger did not endorse Boss’s views or indeed contribute to them in 1953 and reaffirm them in 1972. It seems likely that, precisely because Heidegger did so that Boss felt justified in attributing his own 1953 words directly to ‘Heidegger’ in the conversation of 1972.]
A
final example of mistranslation: Heidegger’s crossed-out ‘Sein’ is not
translated in the standard way as a crossed-out ‘being’ (S. 240, p. 193), but
as ‘[appropriated by] being’ (translators’ brackets). This gives no idea of
Heidegger’s adventurous notation.
The
proofreading seems to have been skimpy. Teilhard de Chardin’s book, The Phenomenon of Man, is not ‘The Phenomenology of Man’ (p. 56, n.).
And what about ‘L’Ecircumflextre
et le Néant’ by ‘Satre’ (p. 157, n.)?
Greek
words are written with Greek letters, but breathings and accents are bestowed
on only a few of the words, apparently completely haphazardly.
Square
brackets appear in profusion. But they are oddly used. The translators have
Heidegger saying, in the seminar of 8 July 1965, ‘[we] medical professionals’
(p. 103, their brackets). This means Heidegger did not say ‘we’ but implied it.
But the original (S. 133) has him
saying, rhetorically, ‘wir im ärztlichen Beruf’ (‘we in the medical
profession’). If the translators wanted to signal disbelief, they could have
inserted ‘[sic]’.
Again,
in his letter of 26 March 1960 (S. 319, p. 254), Heidegger characterises the
theme of the ‘psychologists-congress’ (see above) as ‘dem ganzen Salat’, ‘the whole mess’ (my
translation). He then says, ‘verzeihen Sie’, which the translators render as
‘[excuse me]’ (their brackets), as if he had not said these words. But he had said them.
Even
odder is their rendering of a phrase of Descartes’s as: ‘[n]ous rendre comme maîtres
et possesseurs de la nature’ (their brackets). The original, again, has not
‘Nous’, nor ‘vous’, nor even ‘tous’, but, precisely, ‘nous’ (S. 136, p. 105).
Conversely,
when square brackets are called for, they are often omitted. When Heidegger
says, ‘Hölderlin sagt…’ (S. 183), the translation makes him say, portentously, ‘Johann
Christian Friedrich Hölderlin says…’ (p. 140).
In
the seminar of 11 May 1965, Heidegger reads (S. 100–102, pp. 77–78) from a
lecture on psychosomatics by Dr R. Hegglin. In the German, this is clearly set
off from Heidegger’s comments by quotation marks and paragraph breaks. In the
translation, the start gets a quotation mark but no new paragraph; the end gets
a new paragraph but no quotation mark. The reader has to struggle to work out
where the extract starts and ends.
Finally,
there is an elementary publishing error. The cover of the paperback has a
photograph of Heidegger and Boss, back to front. It was the right way round in Zollikoner Seminare (opposite S. 324),
with a note that the men are in conversation on the Feldweg at Meßkirch in
1963. The note is missing from the paperback.
The
original photograph shows Boss on Heidegger’s left. Those who know Meßkirch can
see that the shadows fall westward, so it is morning, the time when, Boss tells
us (1982a [1977b]: 212; 1988 [1978–9]: 8), Heidegger said ‘das Denken’ came
upon him. Heidegger wears a man’s jacket, buttoning on the right. The paperback
shows Boss on Heidegger’s right, the shadows falling to the right, so that it
appears to be afternoon. And Heidegger’s jacket seems to button the woman’s
way.
One
does not expect such an elementary mistake from a university publisher. It is
particularly unfortunate, as in the book itself Heidegger is shown patiently
trying to teach seminar participants to see the nature of lived space, which is
not reversible.
The
errors of translation cannot be justified by quoting Heidegger on ‘übersetzen’and ‘übersetzen’ (p. 331). The accumulation of errors is insidious. It
erodes meaning, and makes it difficult to trust the translation as a whole.
Anyone wishing to quote it should first consult the original, with the help, if
necessary, of a knowledgeable speaker of German.
It is
surprising that the review of this translation in this Journal, by Professor
Miles Groth (2002), does not mention the translation itself. The review even
reports, accurately, Heidegger’s recommendations for reading. But it omits to
mention that, as documented above, the translation confuses the ‘Feldweggespräch’ with Der Feldweg and misrepresents
Heidegger as wanting readers to contrast Der
Feldweg with Gelassenheit. Thus
the review silently corrects, and covers over, these errors.
[Revised ending (2021):]
I ended my original (2002) and (2003) reviews, at the request of the editor of Daseinsanalyse, Dr. Holger Helting, with a polite expression of ‘hope’ for an ‘improved’ and ‘corrected’ second edition of the present translation. We have been spared that. But, thirty-three years after this extraordinary book was published, there is still an urgent need for a good English translation.
[1] The translation
indicates the page numbers of the first German edition, not of the second.
These numbers differ only for Boss’s (otherwise identical) preface to the
German editions.
[2] This article is a
slightly revised version of a review (Stadlen 2003c) published in Existential Analysis, itself a longer
version of a review (Stadlen 2002) published in the Daseinsanalyse yearbook. I thank Dr. Holger Helting, the editor of Daseinsanalyse, for his permission to
publish. I am grateful to Mr Martin Davies, Prof. Dr. med. et phil. Gion
Condrau, Dr. Holger Helting, Mr Richard Skues, Mrs Hedi Stadlen, Mrs Naomi
Stadlen, and Ms Daniela Zimmermann for their constructive suggestions and
criticisms.
[3] For an
examination of some aspects of the book itself, particularly of Heidegger’s and
Boss’s medicalising of Da-sein, see
Stadlen 2003b: 166–167, 173–175; and Stadlen and Stadlen 2004.
[4] S. =
page in Zollikoner Seminare, p. =
page in Zollikon Seminars.
[5] GW = Freud Gesammelte Werke, SE = Freud Standard Edition.
[6] Professor
Condrau objected to me that this was not a castration, because it was a
‘sex-change’ operation. However, Boss himself referred to it as a ‘castration’,
both in Psyche (4.7: 399) and in the
cited footnote (S. 303) in Zollikoner
Seminare.
[7] CW = Jung Collected Works.
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Anthony Stadlen practises in London London Freud Museum , London
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